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Facilitating Intergovernmental 
Dialogue: Judicial Review of the 
Division of Powers in the Supreme  
Court of Canada 
Wade K. Wright∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A cursory review of any Canadian law review tells the story: the Ca-
nadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 is “in” and the division of 
powers is “out”. Since 1982, when the Charter came into force, there has 
been a vast amount of writing about the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
Charter decisions. However, its division of powers decisions, once the 
staple of constitutional law scholars, are now routinely ignored, particu-
larly in English Canada.2 This trend has been noted before, with little 
effect. Writing at the turn of the century, Wayne MacKay, for example, 
lamented the lack of attention that constitutional law scholars now pay to 
the division of powers.3 Ten years later, however, the situation is not sig-
nificantly different. The Supreme Court released a number of important 
division of powers decisions in this period. Some work has been done 
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1
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2
 The Supreme Court’s division of powers decisions garner significantly more attention in 
the French-Canadian scholarship: see, e.g., E. Brouillet, La Négation de la Nation — L’identité 
Culturelle Québécoise et le Fédéralisme Canadien (Sainte-Foy, QC: Septentrion, 2005). 
3
 A.W. MacKay, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Federalism: Does/Should Anyone 
Care Anymore?” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 241, at 242 [hereinafter “MacKay, ‘The Supreme Court of 
Canada and Federalism’”]; see also D. Greschner, “The Supreme Court, Federalism and Metaphors 
of Moderation” (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 47, at 48. 
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discussing particular decisions and criticizing doctrinal developments;4 
some decisions have been considered briefly in the context of discussions 
about a specific area of regulation (e.g., the environment) or issue (e.g., 
the scope of the spending power);5 but little has been written about the 
theory of judicial review6 that appears to be animating the Supreme 
Court’s decision-making.7  
This paper aims to fill this gap in the academic literature, by provid-
ing a novel account of the Supreme Court’s theory of judicial review of 
the division of powers. Under this theory, the Supreme Court encourages 
the political branches to take the lead in defining the division of powers, 
by working out a mutually acceptable allocation of jurisdiction in each 
particular regulatory area. The Supreme Court limits itself primarily to 
facilitating intergovernmental dialogue about the division of powers and 
resolving the conflicts that result where the political branches fail to 
agree, and only secondarily to ensuring that neither order of government 
dramatically upsets the balance of power. 
This theory of judicial review is gleaned from two sources. The first 
is the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Canadian Western Bank v. 
Alberta.8 In Canadian Western Bank, the majority of the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                             
4
 The gold standard remains P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. supp. (To-
ronto: Carswell, 2007) [hereinafter “Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada”] (with yearly updates on 
the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions). The Supreme Court’s division of powers decisions 
are also briefly reviewed in the annual “Developments in Constitutional Law” article published in 
the Supreme Court Law Review: see, e.g., C. Mathen, “Developments in Constitutional Law: The 
2008-2009 Term” (2009) 48 S.C.L.R. (2d) 71.  
5
 See, e.g., P.W. Hogg, “Constitutional Authority Over Greenhouse Gas Emissions” (2009) 
46 Alta. L. Rev. 507; (2008-2009) 34 Queen’s L.J (various articles discussing the spending power). 
6
 I distinguish in this paper between theories of federalism and theories of judicial review. 
By theories of federalism, I mean theories that describe how governmental power ought to be allo-
cated in a federal system. By theories of judicial review, I mean theories that describe the role, if 
any, that the courts ought to play in reviewing (and setting limits on) exercises of governmental 
power in a federal system. 
7
 The major exceptions are: E. Brouillet, “The Federal Principle and the 2005 Balance of 
Powers in Canada” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 308 [hereinafter “Brouillet, ‘The Federal Principle’”]; B. 
Ryder, “The End of Umpire?: Federalism and Judicial Restraint” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 345 [here-
inafter “Ryder, ‘The End of Umpire?”’]; G. Baier, “The Courts, the Division of Powers, and Dispute 
Resolution” in H. Bakvis & G. Skogstad, eds., Canadian Federalism, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2008), at c. 2; G. Baier, “Judicial Review and Dispute Resolution”, in H. Bakvis, G. 
Baier & D. Brown, eds., Contested Federalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at c. 5; J. 
Leclair, “The Supreme Court of Canada’s Understanding of Federalism” (2003) 28 Queen’s L.J. 
411; and J. Leclair, “The Elusive Quest for the Quintessential ‘National Interest’” (2005) 38 U.B.C. 
L. Rev. 355.  
8
 [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian Western Bank”]. 
Canadian Western Bank was released concurrently with British Columbia (Attorney General) v. 
Lafarge Canada Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 23, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 86 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lafarge”]. I 
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significantly restricted the application of the doctrine of interjurisdic-
tional immunity (described below). In doing so, it provided rare but 
important insight into its theory of judicial review. The decision has been 
discussed by several others; however, little if any substance has been 
written about the theory of judicial review described in, and animating, 
the decision.9 The second is the pre-Canadian Western Bank division of 
powers decisions of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice McLachlin 
(2000 to present) (the “McLachlin Court”).10 The theory of judicial re-
view described in Canadian Western Bank was not new. The Supreme 
Court merely made explicit a theory of judicial review that had quietly 
been at work in its division of powers decisions for a number of years.11 
Looked at in retrospect, and with the benefit of Canadian Western Bank, 
these decisions provide important insight into the theory of judicial re-
view later outlined in Canadian Western Bank itself.12  
                                                                                                             
focus here on the decision in Canadian Western Bank, because it contains the bulk of the majority’s 
legal and theoretical analysis. 
9
 See R. Elliot, “Interjurisdictional Immunity after Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge 
Canada Inc.: The Supreme Court Muddies the Doctrinal Waters — Again” (2008) 43 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
433, at 472 (noting that the theoretical aspect of the decision “warrants critical scrutiny”, and ex-
pressly limiting this article to the decision’s doctrinal aspects); P.W. Hogg & R. Godil, “Narrowing 
Interjurisdictional Immunity” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 623 [hereinafter “Hogg & Godil, ‘Narrowing 
Interjurisdictional Immunity’”] (focusing largely on doctrine); J.G. Furey, “Interjurisdictional Im-
munity: The Pendulum Has Swung” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 597 (focusing largely on doctrine); and 
E. Edinger, “Back to the Future with Interjurisdictional Immunity: Canadian Western Bank v. Al-
berta; British Columbia v. Lafarge Canada Inc” (2008) 66 Adv. 553 (focusing largely on doctrine). 
10
 I limit my discussion to the division of powers decisions of the McLachlin Court, because 
this provided a convenient way of restricting my discussion. In doing so, I should not be taken as 
suggesting that the theory of judicial review that I describe is wholly unique to the McLachlin 
Court’s division of powers decisions. Important aspects of the approach to the division of powers 
that I describe were evident in earlier Supreme Court division of powers decisions, including, in 
particular, the division of powers decisions of Chief Justice Dickson (1973-1990) and the Supreme 
Court during the tenure of Chief Justice Lamer (1990-2000). For discussion of the division of pow-
ers decisions of Dickson C.J.C., see, e.g., K. Swinton, The Supreme Court and Canadian Federalism 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1990), at c. 10 [hereinafter “Swinton, The Supreme Court and Canadian Feder-
alism”]; J.T. Saywell, The Lawmakers: Judicial Power and the Shaping of Canadian Federalism 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), at c. 11; and G. Baier, Courts and Federalism: Judi-
cial Doctrine in the United States, Australia and Canada (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2006), at c. 5 [hereinafter “Baier, Courts and Federalism”]. For discussion of the 
division of powers decisions of the Supreme Court under Lamer C.J.C., see MacKay, “The Supreme 
Court of Canada and Federalism”, supra, note 3; Saywell, The Lawmakers, at c. 11; and Baier, 
Courts and Federalism, at c. 5. 
11
 Some of these decisions are discussed in the sources listed in note 7. However, these sources 
tend to overlook or underestimate the role that intergovernmental dialogue plays in the decisions. 
12
 Two important exceptions should be noted. First, I consider only the decisions (or parts of 
the decisions) dealing with the division of powers in ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. Second, I do not consider the 
division of powers decisions that touch upon, directly or indirectly, s. 91(24), the federal legislative 
power over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians”. (The decisions are: Lovelace v. Ontario, 
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The notion of intergovernmental dialogue figures prominently in this 
theory of judicial review. Dialogue is a term that is now ubiquitous in 
writing about constitutional law in Canada and elsewhere.13 In Canada, it 
has been used mostly in connection with cases decided under the Char-
ter.14 In that connection, it has been taken to refer, narrowly, to the ability 
of the competent legislative body to respond, legislatively, to a judicial 
decision striking down a law for violating the Charter.15 I used the term 
in that narrower sense in a previous paper.16 But the term dialogue also 
can, and has, been used in a broader sense, to describe the interactions 
that occur between the various branches of government (and indeed soci-
ety as a whole) in the area of constitutional decision-making.17 I use the 
term in that broader sense in this paper.18 However, unlike the dialogue 
that occurs in connection with the Charter, which is in large measure  
intragovernmental (or horizontal), the dialogue that I describe here is 
                                                                                                             
[2000] S.C.J. No. 36, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lovelace”]; Kitkatla Band v. British 
Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture), [2002] S.C.J. No. 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 
146 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kitkatla Band”]; Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), 
[2003] S.C.J. No. 34, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Paul”]; and R. v. Morris, [2006] 
S.C.J. No. 59, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 915 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morris”].) These cases raise unique and 
difficult issues — in particular, issues of self-government and the interaction between s. 91(24) and 
s. 88 of the federal Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, which operates to make certain otherwise consti-
tutionally inapplicable provincial laws applicable to “Indians” — not encountered in the other 
division of powers cases; for that reason, my view is that they ought to be addressed separately. See 
B. Ryder, “The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism” (1990-1991) 36 
McGill L.J. 308, at 362-80 [hereinafter “Ryder, ‘The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm’”] 
(advocating a unique approach to s. 91(24) cases). 
13
 See C. Bateup, “The Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories of 
Constitutional Dialogue” (2005-2006) 71 Brook. L. Rev. 1109, at 1109 [hereinafter “Bateup, ‘The 
Dialogic Promise’”] (describing dialogue as ubiquitous). 
14
 But see J. Kelly & M. Murphy, “Shaping the Constitutional Dialogue on Federalism” 
(2005) 35(2) Publius 217 (using the term in connection with the Supreme Court’s Aboriginal rights 
decisions and its decision in the Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 
S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Quebec Secession Reference”]).  
15
 P.W. Hogg & A.A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or 
Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75. 
16
 P.W. Hogg, A.A. Bushell Thornton & W.K. Wright, “Charter Dialogue Revisited — Or 
Much Ado About Metaphors” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1, at 45. 
17
 The dialogue literature is sizeable. For a good summary, see C. Bateup, “The Dialogic 
Promise”, supra, note 13; and C. Bateup, “Expanding the Conversation: American and Canadian 
Experiences of Constitutional Dialogue in Comparative Perspective” (2007) 21 Temp. Int. & Comp. 
L.J. 1. 
18
 The manner in which my colleagues and I used the term dialogue in “Charter Dialogue 
Revisited” has been criticized: see, for example, C. Bateup, “The Dialogic Promise”, id. It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to respond to this criticism here, but briefly, my view that there is no neces-
sary inconsistency between the narrow and broad definitions of dialogue. The trend described in that 
article remains, in my view, an important part of the dialogue story, but it is not, I accept, the only 
story. 
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primarily intergovernmental (or vertical).19 By dialogue, I mean the fed-
eral-provincial agreement, not judicial-legislative and/or judicial-
executive agreement, about particular exercises of legislative power that 
the Supreme Court seems intent on facilitating. 
The paper is organized in three main parts. In Part II, I outline the 
basic features of the theory of judicial review described in Canadian 
Western Bank. I then discuss how this theory is reflected in the account 
of division of powers doctrine provided in the decision. In Part III, I ana-
lyze the key pre-Canadian Western Bank division of powers decisions. I 
demonstrate how the theory of judicial review described in Part II is re-
flected in these decisions, and also comb the decisions for further insight 
into this theory of judicial review. In Part IV, I anticipate three potential 
criticisms of this theory of judicial review, and a possible answer to these 
criticisms. I demonstrate the importance of these criticisms by referring 
to several recent cases that have reached the Supreme Court. 
II. FACILITATING INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIALOGUE: 
CANADIAN WESTERN BANK V. ALBERTA 
In Canada, the banking industry falls within federal jurisdiction,  
under the federal power over “Banking” (section 91(15)), and the insur-
ance industry falls within provincial jurisdiction, under the provincial 
power over property and civil rights (section 92(13)). Traditionally, 
banks were not authorized to promote or to sell insurance. However, in 
1991, Parliament amended the federal banking legislation20 in order to 
permit banks to promote, but not sell, various types of creditors’ insur-
ance, all of which, in some form or another, secured various types of 
bank loans. Following these amendments, the issue became whether 
banks would be required to comply with the existing web of provincial 
legislation regulating the insurance industry. The Province of Alberta left 
no room for doubt. It amended its insurance legislation,21 requiring banks 
that promoted insurance in Alberta to comply with certain licensing and 
consumer protection requirements. 
                                                                                                             
19
 I say primarily because the courts still play a role, but that role is secondary and facilita-
tive. See K. Swinton, “Federalism Under Fire: The Role of the Supreme Court of Canada” (1992) 55 
Law & Comtemp. Probs. 121, at 138 [hereinafter “Swinton, ‘Federalism under Fire’”] (suggesting 
that the Supreme Court “has a role to play in managing conflict and change in the federalism system, 
but its role is secondary and, ideally, facilitative”). 
20
 Bank Act, S.C. 1991, c. 46 (and related regulations). 
21
 Insurance Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. I-3 (and related regulations). 
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Several large banks responded by seeking a declaration that banks 
that promoted insurance in Alberta did not need to comply with these 
requirements.22 On appeal, the Supreme Court refused to grant the decla-
ration. Justices Binnie and LeBel, writing for six of the seven judges that 
sat on the case,23 emphasized that “[t]he fact that Parliament allows a 
bank to enter into a provincially regulated line of business … cannot … 
unilaterally broaden the scope of the exclusive legislative power granted 
by the Constitution Act, 1867.” Rather, banks that take part in provin-
cially regulated activities will, they stressed, be required to comply with 
all applicable federal and provincial legislation.24  
1. The Supreme Court’s Theory of Judicial Review 
The Supreme Court’s division of powers cases are typically 
grounded largely in formalistic legal reasoning, in references to text, doc-
trine and precedent. However, in Canadian Western Bank, in three brief 
paragraphs, Binnie and LeBel JJ. felt moved to reflect on Canadian fed-
eralism. Their discussion provides unusual but interesting insight into the 
Supreme Court’s theory of judicial review in division of powers cases. 
(a) “The Principle of Federalism” 
Under the heading “The Principle of Federalism”, Binnie and LeBel 
JJ. suggest, in one paragraph, and with little explanation or support (judi-
                                                                                                             
22
 The banks relied heavily on Bank of Nova Scotia v. Canada (Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions), [2003] B.C.J. No. 92, 11 B.C.L.R. (4th) 206 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2003] 
S.C.C.A. No. 229, [2003] 3 S.C.R. viii (S.C.C.). 
23
 Strictly speaking, at present, the reasoning in Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 8, can 
be said to represent the views of only eight of the nine members of the Supreme Court: Binnie and 
LeBel JJ., who wrote the decision; McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish, Abella and Charron JJ., who con-
curred in the decision; Deschamps J., who did not sit on Canadian Western Bank, but who concurred 
in the decision in Lafarge, supra, note 8, in which Binnie and LeBel JJ., writing for the majority, 
explicitly adopted their reasoning in Canadian Western Bank; and Rothstein J., who did not sit on 
either Canadian Western Bank or Lafarge, but who did concur in the Supreme Court’s recent 
unanimous judgment in Chatterjee v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2009] S.C.J. No. 19, [2009] 1 
S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chatterjee”], in which it explicitly affirmed its reasoning in Cana-
dian Western Bank (see id., para. 2). Justice Bastarache wrote a concurring opinion in both 
Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge. Although he did not disagree with the result in either case, he 
did disagree with Binnie and LeBel JJ.’s reasoning on the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity 
and the doctrine of paramountcy. Jutsice Bastarache has now retired and been replaced by Cromwell 
J. of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. At present it remains unclear whether he agrees with the 
views expressed by the majority in Canadian Western Bank. 
24
 Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 8, at para. 4. 
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cial or academic), that Canadian federalism had, and still has, three “fun-
damental objectives”.25 The first will be familiar to those with some 
knowledge of the Supreme Court’s previous division of powers deci-
sions: this is the idea that federalism in Canada was a “legal response” to 
the “political and cultural realities that existed at Confederation”, a 
mechanism for reconciling the diversity of the “original members” with 
the desire for national unity.26 The second is also not entirely unfamiliar: 
this is the idea that a “fundamental objective” of federalism in Canada 
was, and is, to “promote democratic participation by reserving meaning-
ful powers to the local or regional level”.27 The third, though, will be 
unfamiliar: this is the idea that a “fundamental objective” of federalism 
in Canada was, and is, “to foster co-operation among governments and 
legislatures for the common good”.28 
In the next paragraph, Binnie and LeBel JJ. then suggest that, in or-
der to attain these three fundamental objectives, “a certain degree of 
predictability with regard to the division of powers between Parliament 
and the provincial legislatures is essential”.29 But foreshadowing the 
changes they introduce to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, 
they also indicate that the interpretation of the division of powers “must 
evolve and must be tailored to the changing political and cultural realities 
of Canadian society”.30 
Justices Binnie and LeBel then make three points about the key divi-
sion of powers doctrines. First, these doctrines “permit an appropriate 
                                                                                                             
25
 Id., at para. 22. 
26
 See Quebec Secession Reference, supra, note 14, at para. 43 (“The federal-provincial di-
vision of powers was a legal recognition of the diversity that existed among the initial members …, 
and manifested a concern to accommodate that diversity within a single nation”); see also Maritime 
Bank of Canada (Liquidators of) v. New Brunswick (Receiver-General), [1892] J.C.J. No. 1, [1892] 
A.C. 437, at 441-42 (P.C.).  
27
 See Quebec Secession Reference, id., at para. 58 (“The federal structure of our country 
also facilitates democratic participation by distributing power to the government thought to be most 
suited to achieving the particular societal objective …”). 
28
 Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 8, at para. 22. For a similar claim from the High 
Court of Australia about the Australian Constitution, see R. v. Duncan; Ex parte Australian Iron and 
Steel Pty. Ltd. (1983), 158 C.L.R. 535, 589 (H.C.A.), per Deane J. (noting that cooperation is a 
“positive objective of the [Australian] Constitution”); and R. v. Hughes, [2000] 202 C.L.R. 535, at 
para. 53 (H.C.A.), per Kirby J. (referring to cooperation as an “elemental feature of the federal sys-
tem of government”); see also Gould v. Brown (1998), 193 C.L.R. 346, at para. 277 (H.C.A.), per 
Kirby J.; but see Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999), 198 C.L.R. 511, at 556 (H.C.A.), per 
McHugh J. (“co-operative federalism is not a constitutional term. It is a political slogan, not a crite-
rion of constitutional validity or power. … Where constitutional power does not exist, no cry of co-
operative federalism can supply it”). 
29
 Canadian Western Bank, id., at para. 23. 
30
 Id. 
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balance to be struck” between the “inevitable overlap” in jurisdiction 
“while recognizing the need to preserve sufficient predictability in the 
operation of the division of powers”.31 Second, these doctrines “must 
also be designed to reconcile the legitimate diversity of regional experi-
mentation with the need for national unity”.32 Finally, these doctrines 
must “include a recognition that the task of maintaining the balance of 
powers in practice falls primarily to governments”, and that they “must 
facilitate, not undermine … ‘co-operative federalism’”.33  
In a few short paragraphs, and with relatively little fanfare, the Su-
preme Court provides important insight into its theory of judicial review 
of the division of powers. On my reading, three key ideas figure particu-
larly prominently in this theory of judicial review. The first is deference 
to the political branches, the idea that the Supreme Court will accommo-
date the fact that “the task of maintaining the balance of powers in 
practice falls primarily to governments”.34 The second is what I call in-
tergovernmental dialogue, the idea that the Supreme Court will work to 
facilitate “co-operative federalism”, which I take to mean “co-operation 
among governments and legislatures for the common good”.35 The third 
is predictability, the idea that “a certain degree of predictability with re-
gard to the division of powers between Parliament and the provincial 
legislatures is essential”.36  
These three ideas are discussed in more detail in the three sections 
that follow.  
(b) Deference to the Political Process 
There are, roughly speaking, two views of the role of the courts in a 
federal system. The traditional view is that the courts play a necessary 
role in a federal system.37 Advocates of this view, in Canada and else-
                                                                                                             
31
 Id., at para. 24. 
32
 Id. 
33
 Id. 
34
 Id. 
35
 Id., at paras. 22, 24. 
36
 Id., at para. 23; see also para. 24. 
37
 This was the view of the celebrated English constitutional scholar Albert V. Dicey. Dicey 
wrote that “under every federal system there must almost of necessity exist some body of persons 
who can decide whether the terms of the federal compact have been observed”: Introduction to the 
Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1915), at xcv-xcvi (emphasis 
added). For Dicey, this was an important reason to eschew a federal system in favour of a unitary 
system. See also K.C. Wheare, Federal Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), at 58-
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where, often do not attempt to justify it; judicial review is simply as-
sumed to be a necessary element of a federal system.38 However, those 
who do attempt to justify this view often place considerable weight on 
the argument that the political process cannot be trusted to protect the 
federal balance.39 
The alternative view is that the courts have little (if any) role to play 
in protecting the federal balance. One argument commonly made for this 
view is that judicial review is undesirable, because decision-making in 
division of powers cases is inescapably political, and accordingly ought 
to be left to politics. This argument is prominent in the Canadian aca-
demic literature.40 Another argument commonly made for this view is 
that judicial review is unnecessary, because the “political safeguards of 
federalism” (certain structural features of the political process) reduce 
the need for judicial oversight of the federal balance. This argument is 
particularly prominent in the United States.41 
In Canadian Western Bank, the Supreme Court demonstrated consid-
erable sympathy for the second view, that judges in a federal system have 
                                                                                                             
66; and W.S. Livingston, Federalism and Constitutional Change (London: Clarendon, 1956), at 10-
11. 
38
 Ryder, “The End of Umpire?”, supra, note 7, at 347 (making a similar observation).  
39
 In Canada, see K. Swinton, The Supreme Court and Canadian Federalism, supra, note 
10, at 40-55 (focusing on the shortcomings of the political process in criticizing the argument of 
several Canadian commentators that the courts properly have a very limited role to play in federal-
ism cases). In the United States, see Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, “The Puzzling 
Persistance of Process-Based Federalism Theories” (2001) 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1459; Lynn A. Baker & 
Ernest A. Young, “Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review” (2001) 51 Duke L.J. 75; 
Marci A. Hamilton, “Why Federalism Must Be Enforced: A Response to Professor Kramer” (2001) 
46 Vill. L. Rev. 1069. 
40
 P. Weiler, In The Last Resort: A Critical Study of the Supreme Court of Canada (To-
ronto: Carswell, 1974) [hereinafter “Weiler, In the Last Resort”], at c. 6 (arguing that judicial review 
of federalism issues should be limited to determining whether: (a) there is a direct conflict between 
federal and provincial legislation; and (b) provincial action discriminates against extra-provincial 
products and citizens, because, in part, the judiciary lacks the competence to deal with federalism 
issues); and P. Monahan, “At Doctrine’s Twilight: The Structure of Canadian Federalism” (1984) 23 
U.T.L.J. 47 (arguing that, because federalism issues are inescapably political, they should be left to 
the political process); but see P. Monahan, Politics and the Constitution (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) 
(arguing that judicial review of federalism issues might not be a problem after all, because federal-
ism decisions typically have very little real impact in practice). 
41
 See H. Wechsler, “The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government” (1954) 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543; J. Choper, 
Judicial Review and the National Political Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); 
and L. Kramer, “Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism” (2000) 100 
Colum. L. Rev. 215 [hereinafter “Kramer, ‘Putting the Politics Back’”]. This argument was adopted 
by the majority of the United States Supreme Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985), but was implicitly rejected in later cases: see John C. Yoo, 
“The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism” (1997) 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1311. 
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a limited role to play in protecting the federal-provincial balance of 
power. This is succinctly illustrated in one brief passage, in which the 
Supreme Court suggests that decision-making in division of powers 
cases must “recognize” and, in turn, accommodate the fact that “the task 
of maintaining the balance of powers in practice falls primarily to gov-
ernments”.42 
Notice the language used by the Supreme Court: on the one hand, the 
Supreme Court clearly indicates that it intends to let the task of setting 
the balance of powers fall primarily to governments; restraint will be its 
posture in division of powers cases. On the other hand, the Supreme 
Court does not say that the task of setting the balance of powers falls ex-
clusively to governments; indeed, earlier in the same paragraph, it refers 
to the courts as the “the final arbiters of the division of powers”.43 It says, 
rather, that the task of setting the balance of powers will fall primarily to 
governments. The Supreme Court clearly still believes that it still has 
some role to play in division of powers cases. 
The Supreme Court did not explicitly justify this posture of restraint in 
division of powers cases in the decision itself. It did, however, provide a 
case reference that does, on further examination, shed some light on its 
thinking. The reference is to a paragraph in the Supreme Court’s unani-
mous judgment in the Employment Insurance Reference.44 In that 
paragraph, Deschamps J., for the Supreme Court, provided an unusually 
candid assessment of judicial decision-making in division of powers cases. 
She wrote that judicial decision-making in division of powers cases “will 
often depend on a given court’s view of what federalism is. What are re-
garded as the characteristic features of federalism may vary from one 
judge to another, and will be based on political rather than legal notions”.45 
In the very next sentence, she then wrote that “[t]he task of maintaining the 
balance between federal and provincial powers falls primarily to govern-
ments.”46 
In this passage, the idea that it is appropriate to defer to the political 
branches in division of powers cases is juxtaposed with the idea that de-
cision-making in division of powers cases will often be informed by a 
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 Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 8, at para. 24. 
43
 Id., at para. 24. 
44
 Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.), ss. 22 and 23, [2005] S.C.J. No. 57, 
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 669 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Employment Insurance Reference”].  
45
 Id., at para. 10. 
46
 Id. This passage is discussed in H. Kong, “The Forms and Limits of Federalism Doc-
trine” (2007-2008) 13 Rev. Const. Stud. 241, at 264-65. 
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particular vision of federalism, a vision that will, in turn, often be in-
formed by political, not legal considerations.47 Although the Supreme 
Court does not say so explicitly, the implication is clear. The Supreme 
Court worries that any line that it might draw between federal and pro-
vincial legislative power will be informed by politics. For that reason, it 
is considerably more comfortable leaving such line-drawing exercises to 
the political branches, as much as possible. 
(c) Facilitating “Cooperative Federalism” 
The first idea that figures prominently in Canadian Western Bank, 
then, is that the Supreme Court, in division of powers cases, will act with 
restraint, and defer to the political branches. This is important, but it is 
only part of the picture. The Supreme Court also makes it clear in Cana-
dian Western Bank that it is not prepared to be entirely passive in its 
division of powers decisions: that it is content to let the political branches 
take the lead in defining the division of powers, but that it will also work 
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 Eugénie Brouillet suggests that this passage “illustrates the absence of a federal theory” 
in the Supreme Court: see “The Federal Principle”, supra, note 7, at 320. I do not agree.  
In my view, theories of federalism (and remembering the distinction I draw between theories of 
federalism and theories of judicial review) can be organized roughly into two groups: substantive 
theories of federalism and process theories of federalism. Substantive theories of federalism work 
from the fundamental premise that there is an ideal (and for some, a permanently fixed) balance of 
power between the federal government and the provincial governments. Substantive theories domi-
nate the Canadian scholarship about federalism (although recent advocates are more likely to 
concede that the boundaries of legislative power, whatever they may be, leave generous space for 
legislative discretion). Unfortunately, in a good deal of this scholarship, very little attempt is made to 
justify why a particular balance of power is ideal — a balance of power is simply asserted as ideal 
and a particular allocation of power is criticized (or defended) on the basis that it is inconsistent (or 
consistent) with this ideal balance of power. However, where an attempt is made to justify a particu-
lar balance of power, an appeal is often made to original intent (the original bargain struck by the 
framers of the division of powers) and/or one or more of the values that federalism is thought to 
serve (these include, usually, democracy, efficiency and/or autonomy). 
Process theories of federalism, in contrast, work from the fundamental premise that there is no 
objectively ideal balance of power. Advocates of process theories of federalism do not necessarily 
deny that federalism may serve particular values, but they do argue that it is not possible to glean an 
ideal balance of power from these values because reasonable people will disagree, first, about the 
values that federalism actually serves, and second, about the weight to be placed on those values. In 
the absence of a substantive theory, process theorists look to the political branches to set the balance 
of power, and resolve jurisdictional disputes. See A. Stone, “Judicial Review Without Rights: Some 
Problems for the Democratic Legitimacy of Structural Judicial Review” (2008) 28 O.J.L.S. 1 (argu-
ing that those who hold democracy-based objections to constitutional rights should reconsider, and 
perhaps oppose, federal judicial review). 
The Supreme Court does seem to have a theory of federalism — a process theory called “co-
operative federalism”, discussed below. With that said, it would seem that the Supreme Court cannot 
quite bring itself to abandon the idea that there are fixed boundaries on legislative power that it 
needs to patrol. 
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to facilitate a particular model of political-branch-driven federalism, 
called “cooperative federalism”.48  
What does the Supreme Court mean by cooperative federalism? Un-
fortunately, the Supreme Court does not tell us. However, cooperative 
federalism appears to refer, at a minimum, to a federalism in which the 
federal and provincial governments agree to exercises of jurisdiction in 
particular regulatory areas, without recourse to the courts. 
This can be gleaned from two sources. The first is a reference, in the 
decision itself, to a passage in the dissenting reasons of Iacobucci J. in 
Husky Oil Operations Ltd. v. M.N.R.49 In that passage, Iacobucci J. referred 
to the “theory of ‘co-operative federalism’ upon which (particularly post-
war) Canada has been built”. As in Canadian Western Bank, Iacobucci J. 
did not define what he meant by cooperative federalism. However, the 
term cooperative federalism is ubiquitous in the academic literature. Like 
Iacobucci J., academic commentators generally use the term to describe 
the division of powers as it has operated in Canada, in particular areas, and 
at particular times.50 The term is used by some commentators in a broad 
sense, by others in a narrow sense. In its broader sense, cooperative feder-
alism typically refers to a federalism in which the federal and provincial 
governments agree to the exercise of federal and provincial legislative 
power in particular policy areas, without resorting to litigation,51 by relying 
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 Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 8, at para. 24. 
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 [1995] S.C.J. No. 77, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 453, para. 162 (S.C.C.). 
50
 See, e.g., Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, supra, note 4, at 6.9 (“In Canada, the 
centralized form of federalism which developed during and after the Second World War has been 
replaced by a form of cooperative federalism in which the provinces have autonomy to influence the 
outcome of federal provincial relationships”); G. Baier, “The EU’s Constitutional Treaty: Federalism 
and Intergovernmental Relations — Lessons from Canada” (2005) 15(2) Reg. & Fed. Studies 205, at 
207-208 (“the Canadian federal system has been much more reliant on cooperative behaviour of 
governments”). 
The complete story is told in R. Simeon & I. Robinson, State, Society, and the Development of 
Canadian Federalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), at c. 6-9. 
51
 W.R. Lederman, Continuing Constitutional Dilemmas: Essays on the Constitutional His-
tory, Public and Federal System of Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981), at 300 [hereinafter 
“Lederman, Continuing Constitutional Dilemmas”] (“[t]he essence of co-operative federalism is 
federal-provincial agreement, whether tacit or explicit, about complementary uses of federal and 
provincial powers and resources”); and J. Cameron, “Federalism, Treaties, and International Human 
Rights under the Canadian Constitution” (2002) 48 Wayne L. Rev. 1, at 39: 
[Co-operative federalism] describes a relationship between the executive branches of the 
two levels of government and is also referred to as “executive federalism.” The relation-
ship is one of direct negotiation between the “First Ministers” of the federal government 
and the provinces, and its object is to forge agreement on issues over which neither level 
of government has exclusive control or jurisdiction.  
See also, from Australia, J. McConvill & D. Smith, “Interpretation and Cooperative Federalism: 
Bond v. R. From a Constitutional Perspective” (2001) 29 Fed. L. Rev. 75, at 75 (“Co-operative fed-
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on a vast network of formal and informal mechanisms and relationships 
developed for this purpose.52 In its narrower sense, cooperative federalism 
is distinguished from collaborative federalism. Both refer to a federalism 
in which the federal and provincial governments agree to exercises of fed-
eral and/or provincial legislative power in particular policy areas. But with 
cooperative federalism, there is a hierarchy between the two orders of gov-
ernment: the federal government exercises a considerable degree of 
political and financial leadership.53 In contrast, with collaborative federal-
ism, there is no such hierarchy between the two orders of government: the 
two orders of government work together as equals.54 This distinction be-
tween the narrow sense of cooperative federalism and collaborative 
federalism is discussed in the final section of the paper. For now, it is suffi-
cient to note that intergovernmental agreement about the exercise of 
federal and provincial legislative power (what I call intergovernmental 
dialogue) is fundamental to cooperative federalism, in both its broad and 
narrow sense. By indicating its intention to facilitate cooperative federal-
ism, the Supreme Court can be understood to be declaring its intention to 
facilitate intergovernmental dialogue about the exercise of federal and pro-
vincial legislative power. 
This is confirmed by the second source of insight, the language of 
decision itself. Two passages in particular are illuminating. In the first, 
the Supreme Court suggests that one of three “fundamental objectives” 
of Canadian federalism was, and still is, “to foster co-operation among 
legislatures and governments for the common good”.55 In the second, the 
Supreme Court suggests, referring back to these three “fundamental  
                                                                                                             
eralism is the process by which the Commonwealth and the States organise for their overlapping 
constitutional powers to be exercised concurrently in order to achieve national outcomes through 
consensual processes”). 
52
 Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, supra, note 4, at 5.8 (“The essence of cooperative 
federalism is a network of relationships between the executives of the central and regional govern-
ments. Through these relationships mechanisms are developed … which allow a continuous 
redistribution of powers and resources without recourse to the courts or the amending process”); and 
D. Cameron & R. Simeon, “Intergovernmental relations in Canada: The emergence of collaborative 
federalism” (2002) 32(2) Publius 49, at 50-51 [hereinafter “Cameron & Simeon”] (linking “coopera-
tive federalism” with the “relationships developed among provincial and federal officials and 
ministers within specific policy areas”). 
53
 This is the sense in which the term is usually used in the U.S. literature: see, e.g., D. 
Elezar, “Cooperative Federalism” [hereinafter “Elezar, ‘Cooperative Federalism’”] in D. Kenyon & 
J.C. Kincaid, eds., Competition Among State and Local Governments (Washington: Urban Institute 
Press, 1991), at c. 4; and Philip J. Weiser, “Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative 
Federalism” (2001) N.C. L. Rev. 663. 
54
 Cameron & Simeon, supra, note 52, at 49.  
55
 Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 8, at para. 22. 
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objectives”, that “the main constitutional doctrines … should be con-
strued so as to facilitate the achievement of the objectives of Canada’s 
federal structure”.56 The meaning of these two passages, taken together, 
is plain: the Supreme Court, in its division of powers decisions, will at-
tempt to facilitate “co-operation among legislatures and governments for 
the common good” — in other words, intergovernmental dialogue.57  
This is interesting. In acting with restraint, and accommodating 
broad exercises of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court seems to have in mind 
a model of federalism in which the two orders of government work out a 
mutually acceptable allocation of responsibility in each regulatory area. 
In practice, this might mean that, in some regulatory areas, the federal 
government will take the lead; in others, that the provincial governments 
will take the lead; and in still others, that the two orders of government 
will establish complementary regulatory schemes. Provided both orders 
of government agree to the allocation of responsibility, the Supreme 
Court seems content. It may be that it prefers agreement that results from 
actual direct negotiation and consultation. However, as I demonstrate 
below, with reference to several pre-Canadian Western Bank decisions, it 
also seems prepared to accept agreement that results indirectly, from an 
organic process of action and response, with legislative power exercised 
unilaterally, and the exercise of jurisdiction agreed to by the other level 
of government after the fact, in a court challenge. 
What justification does the Supreme Court provide for this ap-
proach? The answer is — virtually none. The Supreme Court merely 
asserts that cooperative federalism ought to inform the division of pow-
ers as it operates in the courts. It is implicit in this assertion that, for the 
Supreme Court, intergovernmental cooperation is best suited to adapting 
the division of powers to a changing society and to resolving intergov-
ernmental disputes about jurisdiction. But, the Supreme Court provides 
no justification for this assertion, by, say, grounding cooperative federal-
ism in the text or history of the constitution or (with one exception, a 
reference to a dissent) the precedents of the Supreme Court. Similarly, it 
leaves unaddressed the competing view that cooperative federalism is 
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 Id., at para. 24. 
57
 See also Quebec (Attorney General) v. Moses, [2010] S.C.J. No. 17, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 557, 
at para. 29 (S.C.C.) (efforts at harmonization of federal and provincial environmental assessments 
“an exercise in cooperative federalism”); see also paras. 13 (majority), 84 (dissent) (formal intergov-
ernmental agreement an example of cooperative federalism). 
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neither descriptively accurate58 nor normatively attractive.59 The Su-
preme Court simply asserts, without explanation, that cooperative 
federalism ought to be facilitated by the courts. 
(d) Predictability (or Incremental Change) in the Division of Powers 
The second idea that figures prominently in Canadian Western Bank, 
then, is that the Supreme Court, in its division of powers cases, will ac-
tively attempt to facilitate intergovernmental dialogue about the exercise 
of legislative power. But would the Supreme Court tolerate a radical ad-
justment of legislative power, absent a formal amendment, provided 
there was intergovernmental agreement about the adjustment? The an-
swer, it would seem, is no. This is where the third idea comes into play, 
that “a certain degree of predictability with regard to the division of 
powers between Parliament and the provincial legislatures is essential”.60 
This must be read together with the idea that the division of powers must 
be permitted to change to meet new political and cultural realities, and 
that a court should adopt a posture of restraint, and defer to the political 
branches in setting the scope of federal and provincial legislative power. 
Taken together, the Supreme Court can be understood as saying: that the 
division of powers must be permitted to change to meet the needs of a 
changing society; that the political branches must take the lead in deter-
mining the pace and the extent of that change; but that there is a limit on 
the pace and the extent of the change that the Supreme Court will toler-
ate. The Supreme Court does not articulate this limit, but the implication 
is that it will not tolerate at least some, particularly dramatic, attempts to 
upset the existing balance of power. 
Taking the three ideas outlined above together, the Supreme Court’s 
theory of judicial review can be summarized as follows. The Supreme 
Court encourages the political branches to take the lead in defining the 
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 See, e.g., D. Brown, “Getting Things Done in the Federation” in Constructive and Co-
operative Federalism? (2003) I.I.G.R. 1, at 4, 8 (suggesting that competition is the norm in Canada).  
59
 See, e.g., Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for 
Canada, Report (Ottawa, 1985), Supp. Statement by A. Breton, Vol. 3, at 486-526 (advocating for 
Canada a theory of “competitive federalism”); J. Leclair, “‘Please, Draw Me a Field of Jurisdiction’: 
Regulating Securities, Securing Federalism”, in this volume, at (referring to the “legitimate and 
fruitful interprovincial competition” that “our federalism” is designed to promote); but see Elezar, 
“Cooperative Federalism”, supra, note 53, at c. 4 (suggesting that cooperative and competitive fed-
eralism are not mutually exclusive, because “cooperative” refers to the need of governments to work 
together, not how governments do so). 
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 Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 8, at para. 23. 
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federal-provincial division of powers. The Supreme Court limits itself 
primarily to facilitating intergovernmental dialogue about the division of 
powers and managing the conflicts that result where the political 
branches fail to reach agreement, and only secondarily to ensuring that 
the political branches do not egregiously upset the existing federal-
provincial balance of power. This theory of judicial review is reflected in 
the overall approach to division of powers doctrine described in Cana-
dian Western Bank. In the next section, I describe that approach, and also 
link it to the theory of judicial review described above.  
2. The Supreme Court’s Theory of Federalism at Work 
There are three different ways to attack a legislative measure on divi-
sion of powers grounds.61 The first is to challenge its validity. This is the 
subject of the first stage of a division of powers analysis. The analysis 
varies, depending on whether the validity of an entire legislative measure 
or only part of a legislative measure is challenged. If the validity of an 
entire legislative measure is challenged, the operative doctrine is the 
“pith and substance doctrine”. The court is first required to identify the 
essential character (the “pith and substance”) of the legislation, and is 
then required to assign the legislation to a federal or provincial head of 
legislative power.62 If the essential character of the legislation is related 
to a head of legislative power that has been allocated to the enacting leg-
islature, it is valid (“intra vires”); if not, it is invalid (“ultra vires”). In 
contrast, if the validity of only part of a legislative measure is challenged, 
the operative doctrine is the “ancillary doctrine” (or “necessarily inciden-
tal doctrine”).63 The court is first required to determine whether the 
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 Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, supra, note 4, at 15.8(a). 
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 In identifying the essential character of legislation, both the purpose and the legal and 
practical effect of the legislation are relevant. The purpose will typically be decisive, but the legal 
and/or practical effects are also relevant, in shedding light on the purpose of the legislation, and will 
be decisive where they suggest that the legislation actually has an entirely different purpose. 
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 Until recently, the pith and substance doctrine was applied in cases involving a challenge 
to both an entire legislative measure and only part of a legislative measure. The Supreme Court now 
applies a different approach where only part of a legislative measure is challenged — the ancillary 
doctrine. However, it remains unclear how the ancillary doctrine is to be applied; in particular, it is 
not clear how a court is to determine whether a provision encroaches on the jurisdiction of the other 
order of government at step 1. In two cases, the Supreme Court seemed to apply the pith and sub-
stance doctrine: see Global Securities Corp. v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), [2000] 
S.C.J. No. 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 494, at paras. 19-20 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Global Securities Corp.”]; 
and Kitkatla Band, supra, note 12, at paras. 65-71. However, in a later case, the Supreme Court 
seemed to apply a different approach: see Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 66, 
[2005] 3 S.C.R. 302, at paras. 19-27 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kirkbi”]. See also General Motors of 
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provision encroaches on the jurisdiction of the other level of government. 
If not, the provision is intra vires the enacting legislature. But if so, the 
provision may nonetheless still be intra vires the enacting legislature if: 
(a) it is part of a valid legislative scheme; and (b) it is sufficiently inte-
grated into that legislative scheme. The final step turns on the seriousness 
of the encroachment: where the encroachment is minimal, it is sufficient 
if the provision is “functionally related” to the legislative scheme; but 
where the encroachment is not minimal, the provision must be “truly 
necessary” or “integral” to the legislative scheme.  
The second way to challenge a legislative measure on division of 
powers grounds is to challenge its applicability. The operative doctrine 
here is the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. The doctrine of inter-
jurisdictional immunity restricts the extent to which otherwise valid 
legislation of general application enacted by one order of government 
can interfere with the “basic core” of any subject that is under the juris-
diction of the other order of government.64 Where it applies, the law is 
not struck down as invalid; rather, the law is valid in most of its applica-
tions, but is interpreted in such a manner that it will not apply to the 
subject matter that is under the jurisdiction of the other order of govern-
ment. This process is referred to as “reading down”.  
The third way to challenge a legislative measure on division of pow-
ers grounds is to challenge its operability. The operative doctrine here is 
the paramountcy doctrine. The paramountcy doctrine deals with situa-
tions of conflict between otherwise valid, but overlapping, federal and 
provincial legislation. Where there is a conflict, the federal legislation 
prevails; the provincial legislation is rendered inoperative; not entirely, 
but to the extent of the inconsistency between the federal and provincial 
legislation. 
In Canadian Western Bank, after reflecting on “the principle of fed-
eralism”, the Supreme Court outlined in detail its preferred approach to 
these doctrines. The theory of judicial review outlined by the Supreme 
Court is reflected in this doctrinal approach. The Supreme Court acts 
with restraint, by tolerating significant overlap in federal and provincial 
                                                                                                             
Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing Ltd., [1989] S.C.J. No. 28, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641, at 666-69 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “General Motors”], per Dickson C.J.C. 
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 This has parallels with the U.S. idea of intergovernmental immunity, which limits the 
ability of the states to regulate federal instrumentalities: see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316, at 436 (1819) (Maryland state tax on the Bank of the United States unconstitutional). 
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legislative power.65 It does so by permitting both orders of government to 
enact legislation that substantially impacts the jurisdiction of the other 
order of government; by applying the double aspect doctrine to permit 
both orders of government to regulate a given subject area; and by re-
stricting the application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. 
The Supreme Court largely limits itself to managing overlapping federal 
and provincial legislation to avoid legislative conflict. The key doctrine 
here is the paramountcy doctrine. However, the Supreme Court restricts 
its reach, by interpreting overlapping legislation to avoid conflict in op-
eration, if possible, and applying the doctrine in the situations that 
remain. The operative assumption appears to be that permitting overlap 
between federal and provincial legislative power will act as an incentive 
to intergovernmental dialogue about particular exercises of that legisla-
tive power. The Supreme Court does not entirely forswear a role in 
defining the scope of federal and provincial legislative power, but it 
openly encourages the political branches to take the lead in this regard, 
indicating that it will be prepared to intervene only where one order of 
government significantly upsets the existing balance of power. 
(a) Validity: The Pith and Substance Doctrine and the Ancillary  
Doctrine 
The Supreme Court did not discuss the ancillary doctrine in Cana-
dian Western Bank. However, in keeping with its recent decisions, it did 
outline an approach to the pith and substance doctrine that accommo-
dates significant overlap in jurisdiction.  
The approach outlined by the Supreme Court to the problem of extra-
jurisdictional effects is representative. Under this approach, the essential 
character of legislation is determinative. Legislation is permitted to have 
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 The courts have fluctuated between two different approaches to the division of powers 
(often in the same period, but in different subject areas). Bruce Ryder refers to these two approaches 
as the “classical paradigm” and the “modern paradigm”: “The Demise and Rise of the Classical 
Paradigm”, supra, note 12. Under the “classical paradigm,” the emphasis is placed on exclusivity of 
legislative power; overlap in federal-provincial legislative power is limited, to the greatest extent 
possible, and federal-provincial legislative power is relegated to “watertight compartments”. Accord-
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under the “modern paradigm”, much less emphasis is placed on exclusivity of federal-provincial 
legislative power; overlap in legislative power is tolerated, even encouraged. Accordingly, permit-
ting one order of government to act does not necessarily preclude the other order of government 
from acting; rather, in those many areas where overlap is tolerated, it merely supplements the legisla-
tive power of the other order of government. The approach set out in Canadian Western Bank is 
entirely consistent with the modern paradigm. 
(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)   FACILITATING INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIALOGUE 643 
“incidental” effects on the jurisdiction of the other order of government, 
provided its essential character is related to a legislative power that has 
been allocated to the enacting legislature. “Incidental” is defined broadly 
to include “effects that may be of significant practical importance”.66 A 
court working in the classical paradigm would limit the ability of both 
orders of government to impact the jurisdiction of the other order of gov-
ernment. The Supreme Court not only eschews this approach, it sets out 
an approach that permits each order of government to impact “signifi-
cantly” the jurisdiction of the other order of government. The result is to 
accommodate substantial overlap in federal and provincial jurisdiction.  
The approach outlined by the Supreme Court to the problem of over-
lap in the heads of legislative power is also representative. The heads of 
legislative power granted to the federal Parliament and the provincial 
legislatures overlap considerably; as a result, it is often possible to relate 
a given legislative measure to either a federal or a provincial head of leg-
islative power. The classic example is dangerous driving. Legislative 
measures directed at dangerous driving seem to relate to both the federal 
criminal law power (on the basis that they are directed at public safety) 
and the provincial property and civil rights power (on the basis that they 
are directed at the regulation of provincial roads).67 The response of the 
classical paradigm to this problem is to “mutually modify” the legislative 
heads of power: the relevant legislative head of power of one order of 
government would be interpreted as including jurisdiction over danger-
ous driving, and the relevant legislative head of power of the other order 
of government would be interpreted as excluding jurisdiction over dan-
gerous driving. The response of the modern paradigm to this problem is 
the “double aspect” doctrine: the federal legislative measure would be 
sustained under the federal criminal law power, as a measure directed at 
public safety, and the provincial legislative measure would be sustained 
under the provincial property and civil rights power, as a measure di-
rected at the regulation of provincial roads; the ultimate effect is to 
assign jurisdiction over dangerous driving to both the federal and provin-
cial governments.68 In Canadian Western Bank, the Supreme Court did 
not mention the mutual modification doctrine, but it did affirm the role of 
the double aspect doctrine in responding to the problem of overlap in the 
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 Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 8, at para. 28 (emphasis added). 
67
 See P.W. Hogg, “Canada: Privy Council to Supreme Court” in J. Goldsworthy, ed., In-
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heads of legislative power. It noted that “some matters are by their very 
nature impossible to categorize under a single head of power”, and in 
response, it extolled the virtues of the double aspect doctrine, which, it 
said, “ensures that the policies of the elected legislators of both levels of 
government are respected”.69 As with the pith and substance doctrine, the 
result is to accommodate significant overlap in federal and provincial 
jurisdiction.70 
(b) Applicability: The Doctrine of Interjurisdictional Immunity 
The most significant aspect of the Supreme Court’s discussion of 
doctrine in Canadian Western Bank is its discussion of the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity. The Supreme Court reformulated its ap-
proach to the doctrine in three ways.71 First, it raised the threshold to 
engage the doctrine. The doctrine will now apply only if the “basic, 
minimum and unassailable” core of a legislative power granted to one 
order of government would be impaired by a legislature measure enacted 
by the other level of government.72 (Prior to Canadian Western Bank, the 
threshold was merely affects, not impairs.73) Second, it held that the doc-
trine should generally “be reserved for situations already covered by 
precedent”.74 Finally, it said that the doctrine should now normally be 
considered after the federal paramountcy doctrine, at least in “the ab-
sence of prior case law favouring its application to the subject matter at 
hand”.75 (Prior to Canadian Western Bank, the doctrine was usually con-
sidered before the paramountcy doctrine.)  
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These changes are significant, because the basic concern of the doc-
trine of interjurisdictional immunity is exclusivity of jurisdiction, and the 
doctrine as it was framed had the potential to limit significantly the over-
lap allowed under the pith and substance doctrine. A legislative measure 
enacted by one order of government was permitted to substantially im-
pact the jurisdiction of the other order of government, provided that, in 
doing so, it did not affect the core of a legislative power assigned to that 
other order of government. Following Canadian Western Bank, a legisla-
tive measure enacted by one order of government will be permitted to 
impact substantially the jurisdiction of the other order of government, 
provided that, in doing so, it does not impair the core of a legislative 
power assigned to that other order of government. This “leaves more 
room for the concurrence of federal and provincial jurisdiction”.76 
The Supreme Court offered a number of reasons for this stricter ap-
proach to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. The first reason 
offered is that recent division of powers jurisprudence in Canada has al-
lowed for “a fair amount of interplay and indeed overlap between federal 
and provincial powers”.77 This trend, we are told, “finds its principled 
underpinning” in the belief that courts “should favour, where possible, 
the ordinary operation of statutes enacted by both levels of government”, 
and “avoid blocking the application of laws which are taken to be en-
acted in the furtherance of the public interest”.78 For the Supreme Court, 
strong reliance on the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity is incon-
sistent with this trend in the jurisprudence. 
The second reason offered speaks to “the importance of co-operation 
among government actors to ensure that federalism operates flexibly”.79 
Although the Supreme Court does not attempt to clarify exactly why this 
is so, it suggests that excessive reliance on the doctrine of interjurisdic-
tional immunity is “inconsistent” with the “flexible federalism” that the 
Court is attempting to promote in its division of powers decisions.80  
The third reason offered is the need to ensure certainty in the scope of 
the division of powers. Excessive reliance on the doctrine of interjurisdic-
tional immunity would, it is suggested, “create serious uncertainty”, 
because the doctrine requires judges to define the core of the legislative 
powers. This is problematic, because the core often lacks determinate 
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scope. The Supreme Court concedes that this problem could be addressed, 
at least in part, if judges were willing to develop “abstract definitions” of 
the cores of the legislative powers, but this, it responds, would be inconsis-
tent “with the tradition of Canadian constitutional interpretation, which 
favours an incremental approach”.81  
The fourth reason offered is the need to avoid legal vacuums (the ab-
sence of legal regulations in a certain area), which are said to be “not 
desirable”.82 Excessive reliance on the doctrine of interjurisdictional im-
munity risks creating legal vacuums, because laws enacted by one order 
of government cannot effect the core of the jurisdiction of the other order 
government, even in the absence of a law enacted by that order of gov-
ernment. 
The fifth reason offered is that the doctrine of interjurisdictional im-
munity has tended to operate asymmetrically, in favour of federal 
jurisdiction and at the expense of provincial legislation, a practice that 
runs the risk of unintentionally centralizing legislative power. For the 
Supreme Court, this would be “incompatible with the flexibility and co-
ordination required by contemporary Canadian federalism”; undesirable 
as a matter of policy, because “so many laws for the protection of work-
ers, consumers and the environment (for example) are enacted and 
enforced at the provincial level”; and inconsistent with “the principles of 
subsidiarity, i.e. that decisions are ‘best [made] at a level of government 
that is not only effective, but also closest to the citizens affected’”.83 
The final reason offered is that the doctrine is unnecessary, because it 
is always open to Parliament to enact legislation in areas that it wishes to 
regulate that triggers the doctrine of paramountcy, by making it “suffi-
ciently precise to leave those subject to it with no doubt as to the residual 
or incidental application of provincial legislation”.84  
The idea of intergovernmental cooperation plays a key role in the rea-
sons given for embracing this new approach to the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity. The Supreme Court says that “cooperation 
among government actors” is important, because it “ensure[s] that federal-
ism operates flexibly”.85 It also says that the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity should be restricted because: it has tended to lead to the cen-
tralization of legislative power in the federal Parliament, which “is 
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incompatible with the flexibility and co-ordination required by contem-
porary Canadian federalism”; and a “broad application” is “inconsistent” 
with the “flexible” cooperative federalism that the Court is attempting to 
promote.86 The Supreme Court does not explain its thinking in any detail. 
However, its key assumptions appear to be that permitting a fair measure 
of overlap in federal-provincial legislative power will: ensure that the 
federal-provincial governments can flexibly work out different alloca-
tions of legislative power in different contexts, at different times, as 
deemed appropriate;87 and encourage intergovernmental dialogue about 
the exercise of those legislative powers in particular regulatory areas.88 
This assumption, that accommodating overlap in legislative power 
will encourage intergovernmental dialogue about particular exercises of 
those legislative powers, requires further exploration. The idea seems 
counterintuitive. Why would one order of government need to engage in 
a process of intergovernmental dialogue with the other order of govern-
ment if it has the legislative power to act? Is it not more likely that it 
would simply act unilaterally?89 The Supreme Court seems inclined to 
believe that this will not be the net result. Why might it hold this view? 
The benefits of overlap in jurisdiction in a federal system have been 
noted by several federalism scholars in recent years. One benefit that has 
been claimed is that overlap operates as a kind of democratic safeguard, 
allowing one order of government to respond to a particular problem 
where the other order of government fails to act, either effectively or at 
all. This argument figures in the work of American constitutional scholar 
Erwin Chemerinsky, who refers to the benefits of “enhancing” and “em-
powering”, not limiting, legislative power.90 It also seems to be at work 
in Canadian Western Bank, in the concern to avoid “leg[islative]  
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vacuums”.91 However, another benefit92 that has been claimed for over-
lap in jurisdiction is that it can foster cooperation about particular 
exercises of legislative power. The argument is this: overlap in legislative 
power inevitably gives rise to situations in which both orders of govern-
ment wish to provide the same or similar goods and services to the same 
constituents; this, in turn, gives rise to situations of redundancy, where 
the involvement of both orders of government may be of no (or even 
negative) benefit to those constituents; governments, seeking to avoid 
these situations of redundancy, will be inclined to work together, perhaps 
due to political forces, or simply a desire to provide public goods and 
services more efficiently, in an attempt to ensure that this does not oc-
cur.93 It is unclear whether the Supreme Court has this particular idea in 
mind, but it does seem clearly to be working from the fundamental as-
sumption that accommodating overlap will indeed operate to “facilitate, 
not undermine” intergovernmental dialogue. 
With these benefits, why not abandon the doctrine of interjurisdic-
tional immunity altogether? The Supreme Court’s answer to this question 
is decidedly subdued: it says that the doctrine is rooted in the text of the 
Constitution, pointing to various references to “exclusive” legislative 
power in the text of sections 91 and 92; it also says that the doctrine is 
rooted in “the principles of federalism”, but makes no attempt to expand 
on this point.94 However, although it does not say so explicitly, the an-
swer likely has a good deal to do with the Supreme Court’s concern 
about predictability in the division of powers. Recall the Supreme 
Court’s direction that the doctrine should generally only be applied to 
protect exclusive jurisdiction in those areas already covered by prece-
dent. This seems an odd limitation to place on a division of powers 
doctrine. If the doctrine is grounded in the text of the constitution and the 
principles of federalism, why limit it to situations covered by precedent? 
However, if predictability is the concern, the limitation makes much 
more sense: the Supreme Court is worried about significantly upsetting 
settled expectations about exclusive jurisdiction, so it refrains from 
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abandoning the doctrine altogether; but it also is not interested in recog-
nizing new areas of exclusive jurisdiction, so it limits the doctrine to 
situations covered by precedent. The message is clear: change in jurisdic-
tion will be tolerated, but any change must be incremental. 
(c) Operability: The Paramountcy Doctrine  
The Supreme Court concluded its discussion of division of powers 
doctrine in Canadian Western Bank with the paramountcy doctrine. It 
said that, “[i]n the absence of conflicting enactments of the other level of 
government”, the courts “should avoid blocking the application of meas-
ures which are taken to be enacted in furtherance of the public interest”.95 
It then cited this passage from an important article by Paul Weiler:  
… the court should refuse to try to protect alleged, but as yet 
unoccupied, enclaves of governmental power against the intrusions of 
another representative legislature which has ventured into the area. 
Instead, the court should try to restrict itself to the lesser but still 
important role of interpreting statutes of different jurisdictions in the 
same area, in order to avoid conflict, and applying a doctrine of 
paramountcy in the few situations which are left.96 
For the Supreme Court, the paramountcy doctrine is clearly to oc-
cupy pride of place in a division of powers analysis. This is not 
especially surprising. The function of the paramountcy doctrine is to 
manage overlapping regulation. A court, like the Supreme Court, that is 
inclined to accommodate overlap in legislative power is likely to down-
play the importance of doctrines that privilege exclusivity of legislative 
power, and to emphasize the importance of doctrines that function to 
manage any operational conflicts that arise; hence the limits placed on 
the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity and the emphasis placed on 
the paramountcy doctrine. However, the Supreme Court also emphasized 
that the doctrine should be applied with restraint, because it ultimately 
operates at the expense of provincial jurisdiction and also reduces legis-
lative overlap. 
This call for restraint is evident in the Supreme Court’s discussion of 
the definition of conflict. The Supreme Court affirmed, citing recent 
precedent, that there are in fact two definitions of conflict: a narrow  
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impossibility of dual compliance test, which applies where it is impossi-
ble to comply with both laws;97 and a broader “frustration of federal 
purpose” test, which applies where the operation of a provincial law 
would frustrate the purpose of a federal law.98 However, it urged courts 
not to apply the broader “frustration of federal purpose” test too enthusi-
astically, and cited the following guiding principles: that conflict is not 
triggered merely by overlapping legislation; that federal and provincial 
statutes should be construed to avoid conflict, if at all possible; and that 
an intention should not be imputed to Parliament to “occupy a field” ab-
sent “very clear statutory language”.99 Restraint is also evident in the 
Supreme Court’s application of the doctrine to the facts of the case. The 
federal legislation permitted banks to promote insurance, but prohibited 
banks from acting “as agent for any person in the placing of insurance”; 
the provincial legislation required banks to hold a “restricted insurance 
agent’s certificate” in order to promote insurance in the province. There 
seemed to be an operative conflict. However, the Supreme Court inter-
preted the definition of “agent” in the federal legislation narrowly, so that it 
was possible to hold a “restricted insurance agent’s certificate” for the pur-
poses of the provincial legislation, without also then being an “agent” (as 
the provincial certificate seemed to suggest) under the federal legislation.  
The theory of judicial review described in Canadian Western Bank is 
reflected in this doctrinal approach. The Supreme Court acts with re-
straint, by accommodating overlap in federal and provincial legislative 
power, and largely limits itself to managing overlapping federal-
provincial regulation in order to avoid conflicts in operation. The as-
sumption appears to be that permitting overlap between federal and 
provincial legislative power will act as an incentive to intergovernmental 
dialogue about particular exercises of that legislative power. As men-
tioned above, the Supreme Court does not entirely forswear a role in 
defining the scope of federal and provincial legislative power, but it 
openly encourages the political branches to take the lead, indicating that 
it will be prepared to intervene only where one order of government sig-
nificantly upsets the existing balance of power. 
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III. THE DIVISION OF POWERS IN THE MCLACHLIN COURT 
PRE-CANADIAN WESTERN BANK 
In this section, I discuss the leading pre-Canadian Western Bank di-
vision of powers decisions of the McLachlin Court. This discussion 
serves two related purposes.  
The first purpose is to offer a fresh perspective on these decisions. 
The theory of judicial review described above was not new to Canadian 
Western Bank. The Supreme Court simply made explicit the theory of 
judicial review that had quietly been animating its decision-making in 
division of powers cases for a number of years. I trace the manner in 
which this theory is reflected in these decisions. In doing so, I augment 
existing accounts, which tend to emphasize the degree to which the Su-
preme Court defers to the political branches, but overlook its attempts to 
facilitate intergovernmental dialogue.100  
The second purpose is to identify what else can be learned from 
these decisions about the theory of judicial review described in, and ani-
mating, Canadian Western Bank. Although important, the decision in 
Canadian Western Bank leaves many important questions unanswered. 
The pre-Canadian Western Bank decisions provide useful answers to 
some of the questions left open in Canadian Western Bank itself.  
1. Expressions of Intergovernmental Dialogue about Jurisdiction 
The theory of judicial review described in Canadian Western Bank is 
reflected fairly overtly in those cases where the McLachlin Court was 
faced with a specific manifestation or expression of intergovernmental 
dialogue about jurisdiction.  
Intergovernmental dialogue has taken three forms in the cases. The 
first form that it has taken is an intervention, in a constitutional challenge 
initiated by a private party, in which the order of government that is not 
before the court supports the constitutionality of the legislation of the 
order of government that is before the court.101 The intergovernmental 
dialogue here is indirect and after the fact: there is no evidence that the 
enacting order of government consulted or negotiated with the non-
enacting order of government pre-enactment, but the non-enacting order 
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of government intervenes in any event to make the point that it supports 
the exercise of jurisdiction being challenged. This has occurred with 
some frequency in division of powers cases before the McLachlin Court. 
The Supreme Court repeatedly stressed that it will “exercise caution” 
before finding a legislative measure unconstitutional where this oc-
curs.102 The implication seems to be that the Supreme Court will apply 
two standards of review: a more searching standard of review where 
there is no intergovernmental agreement about an exercise of jurisdic-
tion, and a less searching standard of review where there is 
intergovernmental agreement about an exercise of jurisdiction. This is 
reflected in the outcome of the cases: in not one of the decisions re-
viewed did the Supreme Court find a constitutional infirmity where there 
was agreement of this sort about an exercise of jurisdiction. 
The second form that intergovernmental dialogue has taken is a leg-
islative measure structured to accommodate interlocking federal-
provincial regulation. As with the first example, there is no evidence that 
the enacting order of government actually consulted or negotiated with 
the non-enacting order of government pre-enactment, and agreement is 
expressed in the form of an intervention supporting the legislation at is-
sue. However, unlike with the first example, the legislation is positively 
structured by the enacting order of government to accommodate com-
plementary regulation. 
The Supreme Court considered a legislative measure of this sort in 
Siemens v. Manitoba (Attorney General).103 At issue was the constitu-
tionality of Manitoba legislation104 that authorized municipalities to hold 
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a plebiscite to ban video lottery terminals from the municipality. If such a 
plebiscite was held, and the majority of electors voted to ban video lot-
tery terminals, an automatic prohibition of video lottery gaming in the 
municipality was triggered. Siemens challenged the provincial legisla-
tion, arguing (among other things) that it encroached on the federal 
government’s jurisdiction over criminal law (section 91(24)). The Su-
preme Court, per Major J., held that the legislation was a valid exercise 
of the provincial power over property and civil rights (section 92(13)) 
and matters of a local nature in the province (section 92(16)). In support, 
Major J. noted that the federal government had intervened in support of 
the legislation. Justice Major said that “governments, in the absence of 
jurisdiction, cannot by simple agreement lend legitimacy to a claim that 
legislation is intra vires”, but that, “given that both federal and provincial 
governments guard their legislative powers carefully, when they do agree 
to shared jurisdiction, that fact should be given careful consideration by 
the courts”.105 This was the familiar call for deference seen in other 
cases. But Major J. then added an additional gloss. He noted that the fed-
eral Criminal Code106 specifically established an exception to the gaming 
and betting offences where a lottery scheme has been established by a 
province. The legislative record suggested that this was included to allow 
each province to determine whether it wished to establish a provincial 
lottery scheme. Justice Major suggested that deference was particularly 
appropriate where the federal government “has intentionally designed a 
structure ... that … promotes federal-provincial cooperation”.107 
The third form that intergovernmental dialogue has taken is inter-
locking legislation actually resulting from direct negotiation and 
consultation.108 This form of intergovernmental dialogue is unique, be-
cause here, there is actually evidence that the two orders of government 
worked together to establish complementary regulation. 
The Supreme Court considered a legislative measure of this sort in 
Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland.109 At issue 
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in Pelland was the constitutionality of a federal-provincial chicken mar-
keting scheme crafted cooperatively by the federal and provincial 
governments. Under the scheme, a federal marketing agency (operating 
under authority granted to it by federal legislation) set a national chicken 
quota for each province, and a provincial marketing agency (operating 
under authority granted to it by provincial legislation) divided the quota 
up between individual producers in that province, making sure that it did 
not exceed the quota set by the federal marketing agency. Neither the 
quota set by the federal marketing agency nor the quota set by the pro-
vincial marketing agency distinguished between chickens destined for 
the interprovincial market and chickens destined for the intraprovincial 
market. As a result, producers were free to market their chickens inter-
provincially and/or intraprovincially. Pelland, a chicken producer in the 
Province of Quebec, challenged the provincial legislation in Quebec au-
thorizing the provincial marketing agency to set the individual quotas, on 
the basis that it related to interprovincial trade, a matter falling within 
federal jurisdiction, under the federal trade and commerce power (section 
91(2)). The provincial legislation did seem to authorize the provinces to 
set quotas that would, in some cases, relate to chickens sold only outside 
the province. This would typically have been unconstitutional, but did 
the cooperative nature of the scheme make a difference? Justice Abella, 
writing for the Supreme Court, seemed to indicate that it did. She said 
that it was open to the provinces to regulate the marketing of chickens 
without regard to destination, at least within the context of a federal-
provincial marketing scheme. Why? Because the legislation was devoted 
to the “organization of the production and marketing of chicken within 
Quebec and [the] control [of] chicken production to fulfill provincial 
commitments under a cooperative federal-provincial agreement”.110 The 
desire to accommodate a scheme resulting from federal-provincial coop-
eration is striking; indeed, the decision seems to imply that provincial 
legislation enacted in order to satisfy provincial commitments under a 
federal-provincial agreement is, for that reason alone, constitutional. Jus-
tice Abella praised the federal-provincial scheme as a “reflection” and 
“reification” of “Canadian federalism’s constitutional creativity and co-
operative flexibility”, and practically rejoiced that she could identify “no 
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principled basis for disentangling what has proven to be a successful fed-
eral-provincial merger”.111  
The theory of judicial review described in Canadian Western Bank is 
evident in these decisions. As in Canadian Western Bank, the Supreme 
Court did not completely eschew a role in defining the division of pow-
ers. The Supreme Court said, repeatedly, that intergovernmental dialogue 
is not determinative of constitutionality. The clear implication is that the 
Supreme Court believes that it still has a role to play in division of pow-
ers cases, even in the face of intergovernmental agreement about 
jurisdiction. 
However, as in Canadian Western Bank, the Supreme Court is con-
tent to let the political branches take the lead in setting the balance of 
power. This is particularly true where the political branches agree about 
an exercise of jurisdiction in a particular regulatory area. The Supreme 
Court is reluctant to intervene, because this would involve the Supreme 
Court substituting its vision of the ideal federal-provincial balance of 
power for the vision of the political branches. This would be inappropri-
ate, because division of powers cases engage political notions, and 
accordingly, ought to be left to politics.112 
Finally, as in Canadian Western Bank, while the Supreme Court is 
not anxious to play a major role in setting the balance of power, it is 
plainly concerned to facilitate intergovernmental dialogue about the bal-
ance of power. The Supreme Court consistently deferred to expressions 
of intergovernmental dialogue about exercises of jurisdiction in particu-
lar regulatory areas. This encourages, or provides an incentive to, future 
intergovernmental dialogue. In that sense, the Supreme Court is simulta-
neously adopting a passive role (deferring to past expressions of 
intergovernmental dialogue about jurisdiction) and an active role (en-
couraging future intergovernmental dialogue).113 
These decisions also provide more insight into what intergovernmen-
tal dialogue (or “cooperative federalism”) actually means to the Supreme 
                                                                                                             
111
 Id., at paras. 15, 38. For a similar comment in a similar context, see Re Agricultural 
Products, supra, note 108, at 1296, per Pigeon J. (“when after 40 years a sincere cooperative effort 
has been accomplished, it would be really unfortunate if it was all brought to nought. While I adhere 
to the view that provinces may not make use of their control over local undertakings to affect extra-
provincial marketing, this does not, in my view, prevent the use of provincial control to complement 
federal regulation of extraprovincial trade”) (emphasis added). 
112
 Employment Insurance Reference, supra, note 44, at para. 10. 
113
 For a particularly strong call for future intergovernmental dialogue regarding national 
class actions, see Canada Post Corp. v. Lépine, [2009] S.C.J. No. 16, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 549, at paras. 
56-57 (S.C.C.). 
656 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Court. In short, it appears to mean, simply, agreement about an exercise 
of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court may prefer a model of intergovern-
mental dialogue in which the federal and provincial governments 
actually engage in a direct form of negotiation and consultation, particu-
larly where a legislative proposal has important implications for the other 
order of government; it heaped praise on just such a scheme in Pelland. 
However, in the vast majority of the cases, intergovernmental dialogue 
took a different form. It took the form of an indirect, organic process of 
action and response, with legislative power exercised unilaterally, and the 
exercise of jurisdiction agreed to by the other level of government after 
the fact, in a court challenge. The Supreme Court seemed equally pre-
pared to accept this form of intergovernmental dialogue, suggesting that 
agreement is paramount.   
2. Accommodating Overlap, Managing Conflict: Pre-Canadian 
Western Bank 
The theory of judicial review described in Canadian Western Bank is 
also reflected, albeit less overtly, in the McLachlin Court’s overall ap-
proach to decision-making in earlier division of powers cases. I discuss 
how in the section that follows. 
(a) Accommodating Overlap: The Pith and Substance Doctrine 
One of the core aspects of the theory of judicial review described in 
Canadian Western Bank is deference to the political branches. This pos-
ture of deference is reflected in the Supreme Court’s discussion of the 
pith and substance doctrine. Little attempt is made to place strict limits 
on federal or provincial legislative power. Rather, the Supreme Court 
articulates an approach to the pith and substance doctrine that accommo-
dates significant overlap in jurisdiction, leaving it to the political 
branches to determine how legislative power will actually be exercised in 
particular regulatory areas.  
The McLachlin Court consistently adopted a similar approach to the 
pith and substance doctrine in its pre-Canadian Western Bank division of 
powers decisions. It did so in two ways later discussed in Canadian 
Western Bank: by permitting both orders of government to enact legisla-
tion that substantially impacts the jurisdiction of the other order of 
government, and by allowing both orders of government to regulate a 
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particular area of mutual concern, under the “double aspect” doctrine. 
But it also did so in one important way not later discussed in Canadian 
Western Bank: by giving a generous reading to particular heads of legis-
lative power, by eschewing evidence of original intent. 
(i) Challenges to the Validity of Federal Legislation 
The first two methods of accommodating overlap in jurisdiction are 
evident in the Supreme Court’s decision in the Firearms Reference.114 At 
issue in that case were the provisions in the federal government’s gun 
control legislation115 requiring owners to register, and obtain a licence to 
own, “ordinary firearms” (for example, hunting rifles). The gun control 
law was (and still is) controversial. The Government of Alberta, repre-
senting a constituency that is hostile to gun control, referred the law to 
the Alberta Court of Appeal for an “advisory opinion”116 on its constitu-
tionality. Alberta argued that the law was ultra vires the federal 
government, on the basis that it fell within the scope of the provincial 
power over property and civil rights (section 92(13)). The federal gov-
ernment defended the law, arguing that it was intra vires the federal 
government, on the basis that it fell within the scope of its criminal law 
power (section 91(27)) and/or its general residuary power to legislate for 
the “Peace, Order and Good Government” of Canada (section 91). 
It is well established that a federal law must satisfy three criteria in 
order to be valid as an exercise of the federal criminal law power: the 
federal law must prohibit certain activity; the prohibition must be backed 
by a penalty; and the prohibition/penalty must have a valid criminal law 
purpose.117 The majority (3-2) of the Alberta Court of Appeal held that 
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the federal gun control law satisfied these three requirements.118 The fed-
eral law contained a prohibition (both unregistered firearms and 
unlicensed ownership of firearms); this prohibition was backed by a pen-
alty (violation of either prohibition was punishable as a summary 
conviction offence); and the prohibition/penalty had a valid criminal law 
purpose (enhancing public safety by controlling access to dangerous fire-
arms). Alberta appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, 
writing per curiam, agreed with the majority of the Court of Appeal and 
denied the appeal.  
Alberta raised a number of concerns about the federal law before the 
Supreme Court, but one of the primary concerns that it raised was that 
the law inappropriately trenched on provincial jurisdiction, and in so do-
ing, dramatically upset the balance of power. The Supreme Court agreed 
that it was important to take account of the balance of power in deciding 
the case, but said that it would intervene to protect that balance only 
where the provincial effects of a federal law were so substantial that it 
was clear that the law was actually in “pith and substance” directed to a 
matter falling within provincial jurisdiction (or vice versa). The federal 
gun control law did not upset the balance of power in this manner; on the 
contrary, its extrajurisdictional effects were merely incidental. The most 
significant extrajurisdictional effect of the law was that it would elimi-
nate the ability of provinces like Alberta not to regulate ordinary firearms 
at all. However, this was not a problem, because “overlap of legislation 
[was] to be expected and accommodated in a federal state”,119 and the 
double aspect doctrine “permit[ted] both levels of government to legis-
late in one jurisdictional field for two different purposes”.120 
In reaching this result, the Supreme Court was untroubled that the 
law regulated a particular type of property. “Exercises of the criminal law 
power often”, it said, “affect property …, as many aspects of the criminal 
law deal with property and its ownership.”121 What mattered was the 
purpose of the law, and here, the law was aimed directly at enhancing 
public safety, and only indirectly at regulating property. The Supreme 
Court was also untroubled that the law created a complex regulatory re-
gime enabling a federal official (the chief firearms officer) to regulate a 
particular type of property. The answer was the Supreme Court’s decision 
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in R. v. Hydro-Québec.122 In that case, a five-judge majority of the Su-
preme Court upheld a federal law123 that established a complex scheme 
for the regulation of toxic substances. Unlike that law, the prohibitions in 
this law were not defined by an administrative body, but stated clearly in 
the legislation; moreover, the discretion granted to the chief firearms of-
ficer was constrained by the legislation itself. If the law in Hydro-Québec 
was valid, this law was certainly valid as well. Finally, the Supreme 
Court was also untroubled that the legislation did not outright prohibit, 
but merely regulated, ordinary firearms. The answer was the Supreme 
Court’s decision in RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General).124 In 
that case, a seven-judge majority of the Supreme Court upheld a federal 
law125 prohibiting (with exceptions) the advertising and promotion, but 
not sale, of tobacco products under the criminal law power. Parliament 
was free here, as there, to regulate indirectly under its criminal law 
power. 
This decision contains the hallmarks of the approach later outlined in 
Canadian Western Bank. The Supreme Court upheld a law that has a sub-
stantial impact on provincial jurisdiction over property, and dismissed as 
incidental the effects that the legislation has on provincial jurisdiction. It 
also rejected the claim that it ought to protect the ability of the provinces 
to leave particular jurisdictional fields unregulated, in whole or in part; 
the answer to this claim was the double aspect doctrine, which permits 
both orders of government to regulate “different” aspects of a particular 
issue.126 
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The third method of accommodating overlap in jurisdiction — inter-
preting federal heads of legislative power generously, by eschewing 
original intent — is clearly evident in two decisions.127 The first is the 
decision of the Supreme Court in the Same-Sex Marriage Reference.128 
Legislative jurisdiction in Canada relating to marriage is divided between 
the federal and provincial governments. The federal government is given 
jurisdiction over “marriage and divorce” (section 91(26)) and the provin-
cial governments are given jurisdiction over “the solemnization of 
marriage” (section 92(12)). According to judicial interpretation, section 
91(26) confers on the federal government legislative competence to regu-
late the legal capacity to marry (essential validity), whereas section 
92(12) confers on the provincial governments legislative competence to 
regulate the formal ceremonial or evidentiary requirements of marriage 
(formal validity).129 In 2003-2004, the federal government drafted legis-
lation, to have effect across the country, reformulating the different-sex 
definition of marriage to include same-sex couples.130 Anticipating a con-
stitutional challenge from several provinces, the federal government then 
referred the proposed legislation to the Supreme Court, asking it to con-
sider whether it fell within the legislative authority of the federal 
government over “marriage and divorce”.131 
The Supreme Court, writing per curiam, concluded that the federal 
government did indeed have the legislative authority to change the defi-
nition of marriage.132 The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the 
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(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)   FACILITATING INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIALOGUE 661 
meaning of “marriage” was constitutionally fixed, necessarily incorporat-
ing a different-sex requirement. This, it said, was “frozen concepts” 
reasoning that ran “contrary to one of the most fundamental principles of 
Canadian constitutional interpretation: that our Constitution is a living 
tree which, by way of progressive interpretation, accommodates and ad-
dresses the realities of modern life”.133 The different-sex definition of 
marriage “spoke to a society of shared social values where marriage and 
religion were thought to be inseparable”, but Canada was now a plural-
istic society, and what was “natural” to marriage was contested.134 It 
could not be said that “‘marriage’ … read expansively … excludes same-
sex marriage”.135 
This is a striking example of a generous reading of a federal head of 
power. Applying a presumption of constitutionality, the Supreme Court 
placed the burden on those arguing against the legislation to demonstrate 
that the term “marriage”, read generously, could not include same-sex 
marriage. Evidence that “marriage” in 1867 would have been understood 
to include only different-sex marriage was insufficient. The heads of 
power must, it said, be given a generous interpretation, so that the “Con-
stitution succeeds in its ambitious enterprise, that of structuring the 
exercise of power by the organs of the state in times vastly different from 
those in which it was crafted”.136  
The broad reading of federal legislative power evident in the Same-
Sex Marriage Reference was also prominently on display in the Employ-
ment Insurance Reference.137 At issue were the provisions in the federal 
Employment Insurance Act138 relating to maternity leave and parental 
leave benefits for eligible employees. The provisions granted maternity 
benefits to women who were absent from work by reason of pregnancy 
and parental benefits to parents who were absent from work in order to 
care for a newborn child. In 2001, the government of Quebec announced 
its own maternity leave and parental leave benefit program, and initiated 
a constitutional challenge to the federal program, by asking the Quebec 
Court of Appeal, on a reference, to consider whether the provisions in the 
federal legislation were ultra vires the federal government.139 Quebec 
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argued that the maternity leave and parental leave benefits were really 
social assistance measures that fell within provincial competence under 
section 92(13), the provincial power over property and civil rights. The 
federal government responded that the maternity leave and parental leave 
benefits were really temporary income support measures, and that it was 
open to it to enact such measures under section 91(2A), the federal 
power over unemployment insurance. The Quebec Court of Appeal 
agreed with Quebec and struck down the provisions.140 The Supreme 
Court, however, agreed with the federal government, and allowed the 
appeal, upholding the provisions under section 91(2A).141  
Both courts adopted a radically different approach. The Court of Ap-
peal adopted an original intent approach, focusing on whether the 
provision of maternity leave and parental leave benefits by the federal 
government was consistent with the bargain struck by the federal and 
provincial governments in 1940, when the Constitution Act, 1867 was 
amended to grant the federal government jurisdiction over unemploy-
ment insurance.142 It began by noting that welfare and social security 
measures typically come under provincial jurisdiction. It then proceeded 
to analyze a number of period documents, to determine whether, in 
amending the division of powers, the federal and provincial governments 
intended to subtract jurisdiction over maternity and parental leave bene-
fits from provincial jurisdiction, by giving that jurisdiction to the federal 
government. It concluded that no such intent was evident. On the con-
trary, these documents demonstrated conclusively that “the amendment 
was aimed at enabling federal authorities to set up a plan to insure indi-
viduals against lost income following the loss of their job for economic 
reasons, not following the interruption of their employment for personal 
reasons”.143 Applying this reading, the conclusion was obvious. The 
                                                                                                             
released. The federal government agreed to exempt the Province of Quebec from the federal parental 
leave benefits scheme. It amended the federal legislation, providing that federal parental leave bene-
fits would be reduced or eliminated where “benefits are payable to a claimant … for the same 
reasons under a provincial law…”. Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23, s. 23, as am. by 
S.C. 2005, c. 30, s. 130. The federal legislation already contained a similar provision relating to 
provincial maternity leave: s. 22(3). 
140
 Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] J.Q. no 277, 245 
D.L.R. (4th) 515 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter “Employment Insurance Reference (C.A.)”]. 
141
 Employment Insurance Reference, supra, note 44. 
142
 This head of power was added by constitutional amendment in 1940, after the first fed-
eral statute establishing an unemployment insurance regime was declared unconstitutional, on the 
basis that unemployment insurance was a matter of “property and civil rights in the province”, and 
therefore within provincial competence: see Reference re Employment and Social Insurance Act 
(Can.), [1937] J.C.J. No. 6, [1937] A.C. 355 (P.C.).  
143
 Employment Insurance Reference (C.A.), supra, note 140, at para. 72.  
(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)   FACILITATING INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIALOGUE 663 
benefits conferred were “not paid further to the loss of a job for eco-
nomic reasons; rather, they [were] paid further to the interruption of an 
individual’s employment because of a personal inability to work”.144 Ac-
cordingly, the provisions conferring these benefits were invalid.  
Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court, per Deschamps J., adopted 
a “living tree” approach, and strongly criticized the Court of Appeal for 
its “original intent approach to interpreting the Constitution”.145 While 
evidence as to original intent was relevant, it was not to be treated as 
conclusive. The Supreme Court also implicitly criticized the Court of 
Appeal for adopting a mutual modification approach to the heads of leg-
islative power. “[W]here a specific power has been detached from a more 
general head of power, the specific power cannot be evaluated in relation 
to the general power, because any evolution would then be regarded as 
an encroachment.” The proper approach was to “consider the essential 
elements of the power and to ascertain whether the impugned measure 
[was] consistent with the natural evolution of that power”.146 
Applying this approach, the Supreme Court held that the purpose 
(the “pith and substance”) of the impugned provisions was to provide 
replacement income to pregnant women (maternity leave) and parents 
(parental leave) when their employment was interrupted by a decision to 
take maternity leave or parental leave, not the actual provision of mater-
nity leave or parental leave itself; and that this fell within the scope of the 
federal unemployment insurance power. That power was not limited, as 
suggested by the Court of Appeal, to legislation dealing with involuntary 
unemployment. A court must take “a progressive approach to ensure that 
Confederation can be adapted to new social realities”.147 In this case, 
those new social realities included “the evolution of the role of women in 
the labour market and the role of fathers in child care”.148 The federal 
legislative power over unemployment insurance extended to legislation 
aimed, as here, at maintaining economic security, by paying temporary 
income replacement benefits in the event of an interruption of employ-
ment, whether voluntary or involuntary.149  
This is another striking example of the generous reading of a federal 
head of power. In 1940, when the amendment was drafted, maternity and 
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paternity leave benefits were not contemplated. The prevailing assump-
tions at that time were that women would not work after marriage, and 
that they would take on primary childcare responsibilities. However, the 
social reality had changed, and so too, said the Supreme Court, should 
the scope of the federal government’s legislative jurisdiction. The result 
is that both the federal and provincial governments now have the author-
ity to enact legislation dealing with maternity and parental leave benefits. 
The Supreme Court was predictably comfortable with this result. “It is 
rare,” it said, “that all the subjects dealt with in a statute fall entirely un-
der a single head of power.” Moreover, “[t]he power of one level of 
government to legislate in relation to one aspect of a matter takes nothing 
away from the power of the other level to control another aspect within 
its own jurisdiction.”150 
(ii) Challenges to the Validity of Provincial Legislation 
These cases are typical of the manner in which the McLachlin Court 
applied the pith and substance doctrine where the validity of federal leg-
islation was at issue: overlap in jurisdiction was accommodated, not 
eschewed. The McLachlin Court adopted a similar approach to the pith 
and substance doctrine where the issue was the validity of provincial leg-
islation.151 However, it did not do so by offering a broader reading of 
provincial heads of legislative power, as it did in the Same-Sex Mar-
riage Reference and the Employment Insurance Reference with federal 
legislation. This is unsurprising. The vast majority of the McLachlin 
Court’s division of powers cases have turned on the interaction between 
one or more of the federal heads of legislative power and the provincial 
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legislative power over property and civil rights. The provincial legisla-
tive power over property and civil rights had already been interpreted 
broadly by the courts. Where the issue was the validity of provincial leg-
islation, the McLachlin Court accommodated overlap in jurisdiction by 
permitting the provincial legislatures to enact legislation that substan-
tially impacts federal jurisdiction, and/or by allowing both orders of 
government to regulate in particular areas, under the double aspect doc-
trine. 
The decision of the Supreme Court in Global Securities Corp. v. 
British Columbia (Securities Commission) is typical.152 At issue was a 
provision in British Columbia’s Securities Act153 that authorized the Brit-
ish Columbia Securities Commission to order registered brokers in the 
province to produce records “to assist in the administration of the securi-
ties laws of another jurisdiction”.154 The respondent challenged the 
provision, on the basis that its pith and substance was the enforcement of 
the securities laws of another jurisdiction, a matter falling within federal 
jurisdiction. 
The Supreme Court, per Iacobucci J., rejected the challenge, holding 
that the provision fell within provincial jurisdiction. The essential charac-
ter of the provision was the enforcement of British Columbia’s securities 
laws, not the enforcement of the securities laws of another jurisdiction, 
for two reasons. First, in order to enforce British Columbia’s securities 
laws, the Commission would require access to records held outside the 
province. Justice Iacobucci emphasized the “indispensable” need for in-
terjurisdictional cooperation among securities regulators, and said that 
this would be forthcoming only if the Commission reciprocated.155 Sec-
ond, the Commission had an interest in facilitating the investigation of 
possible wrongdoing outside of the province by a British Columbia regis-
tered broker, because this would be relevant to the fitness of that broker 
to continue trading in the province. The Commission could, of course, 
conduct its own investigation, but it could also “choose to have that task 
carried out by a foreign regulator, which is presumably in a better posi-
tion to conduct such an investigation”.156 Justice Iacobucci had little 
difficulty with the next stage of the analysis; it had long been established 
that securities regulation fell within provincial jurisdiction, as a matter of 
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property and civil rights in the province (section 92(13)). Significantly, 
Iacobucci J. did not disagree that the provision had extraprovincial ef-
fects; it did, after all, permit the Commission to order the production of 
records located in the province, which could then be used in an extra-
provincial investigation. However, these effects were said to be “clearly 
incidental” to the dominant purpose of the provision — intraprovincial 
enforcement.157  
The decision of the Supreme Court in Krieger v. Law Society of Al-
berta158 is to similar effect. As in all provinces, the Alberta government 
delegated its power to regulate the legal profession to a provincial regu-
latory body, the Law Society of Alberta.159 The Law Society enacted 
rules of professional conduct for lawyers practising law in that province. 
One rule, specifically addressed to Crown attorneys in the province, re-
quired “timely disclosure” to defence counsel “of all known relevant 
facts and witnesses, whether tending towards guilt or innocence”.160 This 
rule was accompanied by commentary, explaining that it would apply 
only where there was an allegation of dishonesty or bad faith.161 At issue 
was whether this rule was intra vires the province. Krieger, a Crown at-
torney in Alberta who was alleged to have violated the rule, argued that 
the answer was no. The purpose of the rule, he said, was to regulate 
Crown disclosure during the course of a prosecution, by establishing 
more onerous obligations to disclose information than exists at law; ac-
cordingly, it fell within the scope of the federal power over criminal law 
and criminal procedure, section 91(27). The Law Society of Alberta, 
however, argued that the purpose of the rule was to establish an ethical 
standard; accordingly, it fell within the scope of the provincial power in 
relation to property and civil rights (section 92(13)) or the administration 
of civil and criminal justice (section 92(14)). 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written jointly by Iacobucci and 
Major JJ., held that the rule fell within the scope of the provincial power 
in relation to property and civil rights in the province under section 
92(13). Justices Iacobucci and Major noted that there was “a strong pos-
sibility of overlap between the provincial and federal spheres”, because 
the federal government was granted jurisdiction over criminal law and 
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criminal procedure under section 91(27), which includes the authority to 
determine the procedures that govern criminal trials, and the provincial 
governments were granted jurisdiction to license and regulate lawyers 
under section 92(13), which includes the authority to deal with breaches 
of ethics.162 However, the rule was valid, because it was situated in the 
provincial rules of professional conduct; it was authorized by the relevant 
delegating legislation; it was limited to dishonest or bad faith breaches; 
and the commentary indicated that it was not intended to establish more 
onerous disclosure obligations than already existed at law. The result is 
more overlap in jurisdiction. Timely disclosure is now a legal require-
ment, falling within the federal government’s power in relation to 
criminal law and criminal procedure, as well as a professional responsi-
bility requirement, falling within the provincial government’s power in 
relation to the regulation of professions.163 
(b) Accommodating Overlap: The Ancillary Doctrine 
The ancillary doctrine is of relatively recent origin, and it has not 
been applied with any consistency by the Supreme Court.164 However, 
the ancillary doctrine did play a prominent role in two of the McLachlin 
Court’s pre-Canadian Western Bank division of powers decisions. In 
both of these decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed that the ancillary 
doctrine will be applied to accommodate broad exercises of jurisdiction. 
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The first decision in which the ancillary doctrine was applied by the 
McLachlin Court was Global Securities, discussed above. As noted, in 
that case, the Supreme Court, per Iacobucci J., sustained a provision in 
the British Columbia Securities Act authorizing the provincial securities 
regulator to order registered brokers in that province to produce records 
to assist in an out-of-province securities investigation. Justice Iacobucci 
decided the case by applying the pith and substance doctrine. However, 
in obiter, Iacobucci J. also said that the provision could be sustained un-
der the ancillary doctrine, on the basis that it was sufficiently integral to 
an otherwise valid provincial legislative scheme. 
Two aspects of this decision are important here. First, prior to this 
case, the ancillary doctrine had been applied only in cases considering 
the validity of a provision in federal legislation. In this case, Iacobucci J. 
said that it applied equally to provincial legislation. Second, Iacobucci J. 
clearly implied that the ancillary doctrine can be used to sustain provi-
sions that might otherwise be unconstitutional under the pith and 
substance doctrine.165 If so, the ancillary doctrine is not merely an alter-
native to the pith and substance doctrine, used to determine the validity 
of only part of a legislative scheme. Rather, it permits governments to 
encroach on the jurisdiction of the other order of government, in a man-
ner that would otherwise violate the division of powers, provided that the 
provision doing so is sufficiently integral to an otherwise valid scheme.  
The pivotal question in applying the ancillary doctrine is the level of 
scrutiny that will be applied by the court to the challenged provision. 
This question is pivotal, because where the encroachment is minimal, it 
is sufficient if the provision is “functionally related” to the legislative 
scheme, but where the encroachment is not minimal, the provision must 
be “truly necessary” or “integral” to the legislative scheme. Obviously a 
provision that encroaches only minimally on the jurisdiction of the other 
order of government has a much greater chance of surviving a constitu-
tional challenge.166 
The importance of this determination is evident in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc.,167 a case dealing 
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with the scope of the federal trade and commerce power (section 
91(2)).168 At issue in Kirkbi was the passing-off provision (section 7(b)) 
in the federal Trade-marks Act.169 This provision permitted the holder of 
an unregistered trade mark to recover losses resulting from a person di-
recting “public attention to his wares, services or business in such a way 
as to cause or be likely to cause confusion in Canada … with the wares, 
services or business of another”. Ritvik (the manufacturer of Mega 
Bloks) was engaged in a long-running dispute with Kirkbi (the manufac-
turer of Lego) over the marketing and sale around the world of Micro 
Mega Bloks, which closely resembled Lego. Kirkbi, claiming an unregis-
tered trade mark in the Lego design, attempted to restrain Ritvik from 
marketing Micro Mega Bloks in Canada, by bringing an action under the 
passing-off provision. Ritvik responded by (among other things) chal-
lenging the constitutional validity of the passing-off provision.  
An earlier Supreme Court decision seemed to pose a serious chal-
lenge to the passing-off provision.170 In that decision, Laskin C.J.C. held 
that a provision in the federal Trade-marks Act creating, as here, a civil 
cause of action was invalid; the creation of civil causes of action of a 
contractual or tortious nature fell within provincial jurisdiction, under 
property and civil rights, section 92(13). But he suggested several times, 
in obiter, that the result might have been different if the provision estab-
lishing the civil cause of action was included in valid federal legislation 
creating a “regulatory scheme” administered by a “federally-appointed 
agency”.171 In doing so, he seemed to place particular emphasis on the 
idea that the enforcement of the cause of action created by the provision 
must not be “left to the chance of private redress without public monitor-
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ing by the continued oversight of a regulatory agency”.172 The passing-
off provision seemed to suffer from this exact flaw. The provision was 
included in a federal regulatory scheme, but the enforcement of the pro-
vision was left entirely to the chance of private redress. Only the 
provisions relating to registered trade marks were subject to federal regu-
latory oversight. 
However, LeBel J., writing for the Supreme Court, held that the pass-
ing-off provision was valid under the general trade branch of the trade 
and commerce power. In reaching this conclusion, he played down the 
fact that enforcement of the passing-off provision was entirely left to pri-
vate actors, and played up the role of the provision in the legislative 
scheme as a whole. The legislative scheme was directed at protecting 
registered and unregistered trade marks: “without this provision there 
would be a gap in the legislative protection of trade-marks”, and this 
“would create inconsistencies in the protection of registered and unregis-
tered trade-marks and lead to uncertainty”.173  
The result is that passing off is now subject to both federal jurisdic-
tion, under the trade and commerce power, and provincial jurisdiction, 
under the property and civil rights power. Yet again, the Supreme Court 
was unbothered by this result. Justice LeBel acknowledged that the pro-
vision “essentially codifies the common law tort of passing off”, and that, 
“[s]tanding alone, it appears to encroach on provincial power.” He also 
conceded, citing General Motors, that the provincial power over property 
and civil rights “is a significant power and one that is not lightly en-
croached upon”. 174 Nonetheless, the encroachment here was somehow 
merely minimal.175 Accordingly, it was enough that the provision was 
merely related to an otherwise valid federal legislative scheme.  
This discussion demonstrates the extent to which the McLachlin 
Court accommodated overlap in jurisdiction in considering challenges to 
the validity of federal and provincial legislation. In applying the pith and 
substance doctrine, it permitted both orders of government to enact legis-
lation that substantially impacts the jurisdiction of the other order of 
government; it allowed both levels of government to enact legislation in 
particular subject areas, under the double aspect doctrine; and it offered 
broad new interpretations of (in particular) federal heads of legislative 
power, by eschewing evidence of original meaning, where this would 
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narrow the scope of a head of legislative power. In applying the ancillary 
doctrine, it held that the doctrine would apply to both federal and provin-
cial legislation, and it indicated that it might sustain provisions in both 
federal and provincial legislation that would otherwise be unconstitu-
tional, provided they were sufficiently integral to a legislative scheme 
that was valid as a whole. 
In some cases, the McLachlin Court broke new ground. For example, 
the ancillary doctrine had not been applied to provincial legislation before 
the decision in Global Securities Corp. In many cases, new ground was not 
broken. For example, the courts have long held that incidental effects are 
irrelevant to the constitutionality of legislation under the pith and sub-
stance doctrine.176 But in all cases, division of powers doctrine, new and 
old, was applied to accommodate overlap in legislative jurisdiction.  
The McLachlin Court did not completely eschew a role in defining 
the boundaries of federal and provincial legislative power. In the Fire-
arms Reference, for example, it said that it would intervene where the 
impact of a legislative measure on the jurisdiction of the other order of 
government was so substantial that it was absolutely clear that the legis-
lative measure was actually directed to a matter falling within the 
jurisdiction of that order of government. Similarly, in the Employment 
Insurance Reference, it said that the scope of the heads of legislative 
power may change to meet new political, social and economic realities, 
but that the change must be consistent with the “natural” evolution of the 
power. However, in both rhetoric and result, the message was fairly clear: 
the legislative branches have considerable flexibility to set the federal-
provincial balance of power; the Supreme Court will intervene to limit 
the scope of legislative power, but only where one order of government 
dramatically upsets the existing balance of power.  
(c) Accommodating Exclusivity?: The Interjurisdictional Immunity  
Doctrine 
The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity has figured prominently 
in debates, judicial and academic, about the proper balance of power, and 
the judicial role in protecting that balance of power. For those who be-
lieve that there are (at least some) zones of exclusive federal jurisdiction 
(or federal and provincial jurisdiction) that must be respected, the doc-
trine of interjurisdictional immunity has an important role to play in a 
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division of powers analysis — and the courts, in turn, have a role to play 
in applying it.177 However, for those who believe that there are very few 
(or no) zones of exclusive federal jurisdiction (or federal and provincial 
jurisdiction) that must be respected, the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity has a limited (or no) role to play in a division of powers analy-
sis — and the courts, in turn, have a limited (or no) role to play in 
applying it.178 
In Canadian Western Bank, the Supreme Court significantly re-
stricted the application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. 
Consistent with its approach to the pith and substance doctrine and the 
ancillary doctrine, it did so, ostensibly, in order to limit zones of exclu-
sive jurisdiction, and to accommodate overlap in jurisdiction. 
Although important, this change ought not to have been entirely un-
expected, for two reasons. The first is the decision in Law Society of 
British Columbia v. Mangat,179 the only non-section 91(24) decision of 
the McLachlin Court to address the doctrine of interjurisdictional immu-
nity prior to Canadian Western Bank.180 In that case, the Supreme Court 
expressed doubts about the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, and 
said that it was preferable to look to the paramountcy doctrine in decid-
ing the case.181 This was so for two reasons. The first was that the 
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity “would exclude provincial juris-
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diction, even if Parliament did not legislate in the area”; it was preferable 
to rely on the paramountcy doctrine, because it did not lead to regulatory 
vacuums of this sort. The second was that the doctrine of interjurisdic-
tional immunity might lead to bifurcated regulation; it was preferable to 
rely on the paramountcy doctrine, because it would protect federal and 
provincial jurisdiction.182 
It is tempting to treat Mangat as an anomaly. It is only one decision; 
in the 1990s, the Supreme Court did treat the doctrine of interjurisdic-
tional immunity as an accepted feature of a division of powers analysis in 
a series of decisions;183 and in two of these decisions, one released as 
recently as 1998, the Supreme Court actually applied the doctrine and 
read down provincial laws.184 However, just years earlier, in 1987, Dick-
son C.J.C. (Lamer J. concurring) argued that the doctrine ought to be 
applied cautiously, because it operated to limit the “fair amount of inter-
play and indeed overlap between federal and provincial powers” that was 
the hallmark of the Canadian division of powers.185 And in 1989,186 the 
Supreme Court signalled its dissatisfaction with the doctrine, by intro-
ducing a nonsensical qualification that restricted its application.187 
Although the Supreme Court seemed to put its concerns about the doc-
trine to rest in the 1990s, Mangat indicated that these concerns remained, 
or had, in the least, resurfaced. 
However, Mangat aside, there is another, even more compelling rea-
son that Canadian Western Bank ought not to have come as a big 
surprise. In restricting the application of the doctrine of interjurisdic-
tional immunity, the Supreme Court was merely squaring the manner in 
                                                                                                             
182
 Id., at para. 52.  
183
 Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] S.C.J. 
No. 1, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) (immunity from federal law denied); Ontario Hydro v. Ontario 
(Labour Relations Board), [1993] S.C.J. No. 99, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327 (S.C.C.) (same); R. v. Cana-
dian Pacific Ltd., [1995] S.C.J. No. 6, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1028 (S.C.C.) (immunity from provincial law 
denied); Air Canada v. Ontario (Liquor Control Board), [1997] S.C.J. No. 66, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 581 
(S.C.C.) (same). 
184
 Canada (National Battlefields Commission) v. CTCQ, [1990] S.C.J. No. 90, [1990] 2 
S.C.R. 838 (S.C.C.) (immunity from provincial law granted); Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 
437 (same). 
185
 OPSEU, supra, note 102, at 17-22. 
186
 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 
at 955-57 (S.C.C.). Irwin Toy was released only 11 months after Bell Canada, and four of the five 
judges who sat on Irwin Toy also sat on Bell Canada (including Beetz J., who wrote the judgment in 
Bell Canada). The case raised a division of powers and a Charter issue. The bench was unanimous 
on the division of powers issue, but split on the Charter issue. The lead judgment on the division of 
powers issue was written by Dickson C.J.C. 
187
 See Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 8, at para. 49 (affirming this reading). 
674 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
which it applied the doctrine with its overall theory of judicial review. As 
noted, the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity operates to protect 
exclusive enclaves of legislative power, and it does so whether or not the 
other level of government has enacted overlapping legislation in that 
area. However, in both rhetoric and result, the McLachlin Court consis-
tently accommodated overlap in jurisdiction in its division of powers 
cases, in applying both the pith and substance doctrine and the ancillary 
doctrine. It would be incongruous for the Supreme Court to embrace 
overlap in applying the pith and substance and the ancillary doctrines, 
but to reject it in applying the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.188 
Taken in context, the decision in Canadian Western Bank was not unex-
pected — doctrine was merely being squared with theory. 
(d) Managing Intergovernmental Conflict: The Paramountcy Doctrine 
In 1988, in Bell Canada, Beetz J., writing for the Supreme Court, 
cautioned that the pith and substance doctrine and the double aspect doc-
trine must be applied with great caution because there is a “risk that these 
two fields of exclusive powers [in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867] will be combined into a single more or less concurrent field of 
power governed solely by the rule of paramountcy of federal legisla-
tion”.189 Twenty years later, in Canadian Western Bank, the Supreme 
Court threw caution to the wind and basically adopted this approach. The 
Supreme Court made it clear that it would largely limit itself, not to im-
posing absolute limits on jurisdiction, but to managing jurisdictional 
overlap, by interpreting overlapping legislation to avoid conflict in op-
eration, if possible, and applying the paramountcy doctrine in the 
situations that remain. This approach was already firmly entrenched in 
the McLachlin Court’s prior division of powers decisions.  
The paramountcy doctrine figured prominently in three decisions re-
leased by the McLachlin Court prior to Canadian Western Bank: 114957 
Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town);190  
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Mangat;191 and Rothmans, Benson & Hedges v. Saskatchewan.192 One 
aspect of these decisions is emphasized in the academic literature — 
namely, the extent to which the McLachlin Court affirmed two exten-
sions of the definition of conflict.193 It is understandable that this aspect 
of these decisions has received considerable attention. The Supreme 
Court did affirm that a conflict will not be triggered merely where it is 
impossible to comply with both a federal and a provincial law, but that a 
conflict will also be triggered where the operation of a provincial law 
would frustrate the purpose of a federal law.194 It also affirmed that the 
stricter impossibility of dual compliance test will not be engaged merely 
where a citizen cannot comply with both laws, but that it will also be en-
gaged where a government decision-maker cannot comply with (or give 
effect to) both laws.195 By expanding the definition of conflict in these 
two ways, the Supreme Court did increase the situations in which federal 
law might pre-empt provincial law. However, it seems to me that a dif-
ferent, and equally important, aspect of these decisions has largely been 
ignored in the academic literature. This aspect of the decisions emerges, 
not so much from what the Supreme Court says, but from what it does. 
Shifting the focus to results, away from the rhetoric, the primary concern 
of the Supreme Court seems to be intergovernmental conflict (meaning 
conflicts in the positions taken by the relevant government actors), not 
legislative conflict (meaning conflicts stemming from the operation of 
the legislation). The Supreme Court seems to be concerned with legisla-
tive conflict only secondarily, where there is an intergovernmental 
conflict about jurisdiction; where there is no intergovernmental conflict, 
the Supreme Court is reluctant to find a legislative conflict. 
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How is this reflected in the decisions? Consider Rothmans. In that 
case, federal legislation prohibited the promotion, anywhere in Canada, 
of tobacco products, except as authorized elsewhere in the legislation 
(section 19), and it later provided that “a person may display, at retail, a 
tobacco product” (section 30(1)).196 However, Saskatchewan legislation 
prohibited the advertising, promotion and display of tobacco products in 
any premises in the province in which persons under the age of 18 were 
permitted (section 6).197 At issue was whether the Saskatchewan legisla-
tion was rendered inoperative by the paramountcy doctrine. A number of 
major tobacco companies, including Rothmans, Benson and Hedges, ar-
gued that the answer was yes; the government of Saskatchewan 
(supported by the federal government and several provinces) argued that 
the answer was no. 
The Supreme Court, per Major J., agreed with the province. There 
was no concern about impossibility of dual compliance. The federal leg-
islation did not create a “positive entitlement” to display tobacco 
products, but merely circumscribed the general prohibition on promo-
tion; accordingly, it was possible for a retailer to comply with both 
provisions (either by refusing to admit persons under 18 or not display-
ing tobacco products) and for a judge to give effect to both provisions 
(by proceeding on the assumption that the provincial legislation simply 
prohibits what the federal legislation does not prohibit).198 In addition, 
there was no concern about frustrating the federal purpose. The provin-
cial legislation did not frustrate either the general purpose of the federal 
legislation (“to address a national health problem”) or the specific pur-
pose of the challenged provision (“to circumscribe the [federal 
legislation’s] general prohibition on promotion of tobacco products”).199 
On the contrary, the provincial legislation furthered “at least two of the 
stated purposes of the [federal legislation,] namely, ‘to protect young 
persons and others from inducements to use tobacco products’ (s. 4(b)), 
and ‘to protect the health of young persons by restricting access to to-
bacco products’ (s. 4(c))”.200 
The Supreme Court gave short shrift to two arguments supporting the 
opposite conclusion,201 both of which were accepted by the Saskatche-
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wan Court of Appeal.202 The first argument was that the provincial legis-
lation frustrated the specific purpose of the provision in the federal 
legislation permitting retail display. The choice seemed to be quite sim-
ple: a retail establishment that wanted to display tobacco products (as 
permitted by the federal legislation) could comply with both the federal 
and provincial legislation by excluding persons under 18 from the estab-
lishment (as required by the provincial legislation). However, given the 
impracticality in many cases of excluding persons under 18, many retail 
establishments had little choice but to refrain from displaying tobacco 
products. For these establishments, the provincial legislation effectively 
negated the exception in the federal legislation relating to retail display. 
The second argument was that the provincial legislation frustrated a gen-
eral purpose of the federal legislation. In RJR-MacDonald, the majority 
of the Supreme Court held that the predecessor to the federal legislation 
at issue in Rothmans unjustifiably infringed the right to freedom of ex-
pression in section 2(b) of the Charter, and in so doing, expressed 
concerns about an absolute ban on promotion.203 The federal government 
responded by enacting legislation that prohibited the promotion of to-
bacco products, but permitted retail display. However, Saskatchewan 
then enacted legislation restricting retail display. There was an argument 
that, in doing so, the provincial legislation frustrated a general purpose of 
the federal legislation — to regulate tobacco products in a manner that 
complied with the Charter. 
The Supreme Court did not accept either argument. It simply ignored 
the Charter argument, and it asserted, without explanation, that the spe-
cific purpose of the provision in the federal legislation permitting retail 
display was not frustrated by the provincial legislation. The Supreme 
Court was clearly reluctant to find the provincial law inoperative under 
the paramountcy doctrine. But why? The answer may lie, in part, in the 
fact that the Supreme Court simply agreed with the provincial law; “big 
tobacco” has not fared well in the Supreme Court in recent years.204 
However, the answer likely also lies, at least in part, in the fact that this 
was a case in which there was no intergovernmental conflict. The federal 
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government intervened to support the law, arguing that it was enacted for 
the same health-related purpose as the federal law. The Supreme Court 
noted that it was influenced by the federal government’s submissions.205  
Now consider Mangat. One of the issues in Mangat was whether a 
provincial law that had the effect of preventing non-lawyers from appear-
ing for a fee before the federal Immigration and Refugee Board (“IRB”) 
was rendered inoperative, under the paramountcy doctrine, by a federal 
law that authorized non-lawyers to appear before the IRB for a fee. The 
Supreme Court, per Gonthier J., said yes. There was no conflict, apply-
ing the narrow impossibility of dual compliance test: those appearing 
before the IRB could comply with both provisions, either by becoming a 
lawyer or by not charging a fee for their services. But there was nonethe-
less still a conflict in operation, for two reasons. First, the purpose of the 
federal rule was to provide an informal, accessible and speedy process 
before the IRB, in which clients could be represented by those who 
spoke their language, understood their culture and were inexpensive; that 
purpose would be frustrated if only lawyers were permitted to appear 
before the IRB. And second, “it would be impossible for a judge or an 
official of the IRB to comply with both acts”.206 
Of the three cases listed above, Spraytech, Mangat and Rothmans, 
Mangat was the only case in which the Supreme Court held that there 
was a conflict sufficient to trigger the paramountcy doctrine. What 
might account for this different result? Unlike Spraytech and Rothmans, 
this was a case where there was an intergovernmental conflict. The fed-
eral government intervened before the Supreme Court, emphasizing the 
important role that immigration consultants played in proceedings be-
fore the IRB, and arguing that it would frustrate the purpose of the 
federal legislation to apply the provincial legislation to prohibit non-
lawyer immigration consultants from appearing for a fee before the 
IRB. The Supreme Court agreed, and held the provincial legislation to 
be inoperative.  
Results speak louder than words in these cases. Where there is no in-
tergovernmental conflict, the Supreme Court is reluctant to find provincial 
legislation inoperative under the paramountcy doctrine: it strives, where 
possible, to ensure the ordinary operation of the legislation of both levels 
of government, by interpreting the legislation to avoid conflict (Rothmans). 
However, where there is intergovernmental conflict, the Supreme Court is 
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less reluctant to find provincial legislation inoperative under the para-
mountcy doctrine (Mangat). It is not especially surprising to see this 
dynamic at work in the paramountcy decisions. Why? A central concern of 
a paramountcy analysis is now avoiding the frustration of federal legisla-
tive purpose. A court, like the current Supreme Court, that is content to let 
the political branches take the lead in defining the balance of power is 
unlikely to be keen on substituting its view for the federal government’s 
view of federal purpose, particularly in a case where there is no intergov-
ernmental conflict, and the federal government supports the operation of a 
provincial law. Rightly or wrongly,207 such a court is likely to take the view 
that the federal government is better positioned to determine the purpose of 
federal legislation.  
The role that intergovernmental conflict now plays in the Supreme 
Court’s paramountcy decisions is demonstrated particularly clearly in 
Lafarge,208 released concurrently with Canadian Western Bank. At issue 
was a proposal to build an integrated ship offloading/concrete batching 
facility. The facility was to be built on land owned by the Vancouver Port 
Authority (the “VPA”), but situated within the City of Vancouver. The 
stage was set for a jurisdictional struggle: the regulatory regime estab-
lished by the federal Canada Marine Act209 authorized the VPA to 
regulate land use on port lands managed and owned by the VPA, but the 
City of Vancouver had also enacted a zoning and development by-law 
regulating land use within Vancouver city limits.210 However, as might be 
expected, the case was not initiated by either the VPA or the City of Van-
couver: the Lafarge proposal was approved in principle by both. The case 
was initiated by a group of local ratepayers opposed to the construction 
of the facility in their neighbourhood. The basis of their legal claim was 
the failure of the City of Vancouver to require a development permit, in 
accordance with its own zoning and development by-law. Lafarge and 
the VPA argued in response that a development permit was not required, 
by virtue of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity (on the basis that 
the VPA had the exclusive jurisdiction to deal with land-use regulation 
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on VPA-owned land) and/or the paramountcy doctrine (on the basis that 
the VPA and the City of Vancouver land-use controls conflicted). 
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court, per Binnie and LeBel JJ., held that 
there was a conflict between the federal and municipal land-use regimes. 
In so concluding, the Supreme Court seemed to abandon the posture of 
restraint articulated in Canadian Western Bank and its earlier para-
mountcy decisions. There would seem to be no impossibility of dual 
compliance simply where both a federal law and a municipal by-law re-
quire separate zoning and development approvals. The conflict will arise 
only where one order of government withholds its approval. If both or-
ders of government consent, there would be no conflict, and it should (in 
theory, at least) be possible to obtain the consent of both orders of gov-
ernment, by complying with the stricter standards. However, the 
Supreme Court said nonetheless that the impossibility of dual compli-
ance test of conflict was satisfied on these facts, due to simple 
differences in height restrictions and noise and pollution standards. It 
also said that the frustration of federal purpose test of conflict was satis-
fied, although the purpose of the federal law was never identified. 
What might account for this result? The answer seems to be the Su-
preme Court’s desire to accommodate intergovernmental dialogue. The 
federal government had delegated regulatory authority to the VPA and 
the provincial government had delegated regulatory authority to the City 
of Vancouver, and both the VPA and the City had approved the Lafarge 
proposal. This seemed to be decisive for the Supreme Court. This pas-
sage from the Supreme Court’s decision is particularly striking in this 
regard: 
A successful harbour in the 21st century requires federal provincial 
cooperation. The courts should not be astute to find ways to frustrate 
rather than facilitate such cooperation where it exists if this can be done 
within the rules laid down by the Constitution.  
Here the VPA and the City worked out a cooperative framework. The 
Lafarge project, although opposed by the Ratepayers, complied with 
the land use envisaged by both levels of government in their respective 
planning documents.  
Of course, consent cannot confer jurisdiction where none exists. In this 
case, however, the project was found by those most closely concerned 
in … to be dealt with through federal rather than municipal procedures. 
No reason has been shown for us to interfere. 
. . . . . 
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Where the VPA and the City are in disagreement, of course, the courts 
will have to resolve the difference. But that is not this case.211 
The Supreme Court is clearly anxious to facilitate intergovernmental 
dialogue, and in this case, interestingly enough, this compels the Su-
preme Court to act. The Supreme Court finds a conflict between the 
federal and the municipal regulatory regime, in order to preserve the 
fruits of the cooperation of these two stakeholders.212 The ratepayers are, 
it seems, mere busybodies, insufficiently “closely concerned” to justify 
“interfering”.  
This brings to the surface an important implication of the Supreme 
Court’s theory of judicial review. The traditional view is that both gov-
ernments and private parties are entitled to hold governments to the 
division of powers, and that courts should take seriously division of 
powers challenges initiated by private parties. This view was challenged 
over 30 years ago by Paul Weiler.213 Working from an assumption that 
the division of powers engages individual interests in a limited way, if at 
all, Weiler argued that courts should generally refuse to entertain non-
government division of powers claims. Thirty years later, Weiler’s argu-
ment seems to hold considerable purchase with the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court did continue to hear division of powers cases initiated by 
private parties; it regularly denied that federal-provincial agreement 
about jurisdiction is determinative of constitutionality; and in one case, it 
even explicitly disclaimed the view that the division of powers does not 
engage private interests.214 However, it also said, time and again, that it 
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would be particularly hesitant to strike down a legislative measure in the 
face of intergovernmental dialogue. Moreover, private citizens have 
regularly failed in challenging legislation absent intergovernmental con-
flict. The implication seems fairly clear. For the Supreme Court, there is 
a sharp distinction between judicial review under the Charter and the di-
vision of powers: Charter review is seen to engage individual interests, 
whereas federalism review is not, at least not directly. For that reason, 
private division of powers challenges that do not garner the support of 
the non-enacting order of government are approached with caution. 
(e) Summary 
In its division of powers decisions, the McLachlin Court consistently 
adopted the approach it later outlined in Canadian Western Bank. It regu-
larly accommodated overlap in jurisdiction in the manner in which it 
applied both the pith and substance doctrine and the interjurisdictional 
doctrine. It largely limited itself to managing overlapping legislation: 
where there was no intergovernmental conflict, it was reluctant to find a 
legislative conflict, and typically attempted to ensure the operation of the 
legislation of both orders of government, by interpreting the legislation to 
avoid conflict in operation; where there was an intergovernmental conflict, 
it still attempted to interpret legislation to limit conflict in operation, but it 
was less reluctant to apply the paramountcy doctrine. 
The approach adopted in these decisions is reflective of the theory of 
judicial review outlined by the Supreme Court in Canadian Western 
Bank. As in Canadian Western Bank, the Supreme Court, in these deci-
sions, did not entirely leave the division of powers to the political 
branches. It encouraged the political branches to take the lead in setting 
the balance of power, but implied that it would still be prepared to inter-
vene in situations where either order of government dramatically upset 
the balance of power. 
The last element of the theory of judicial review outlined in Cana-
dian Western Bank, facilitating intergovernmental dialogue, is reflected 
less overtly. However, on closer inspection, it is also quietly at work in 
these decisions as well. The paramountcy decisions are particularly inter-
esting. The Supreme Court was reluctant to find a conflict in operation 
where there was no intergovernmental conflict about jurisdiction, but it 
was less reluctant to do so where there was an intergovernmental con-
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flict. As in Canadian Western Bank, the motivation seemed to be to fa-
cilitate intergovernmental dialogue. 
These decisions also provide further insight into this theory of judi-
cial review. For example, under this theory, private litigants have a 
reduced chance of success, particularly where the legislation at issue re-
flects some form of intergovernmental dialogue. The paramountcy cases 
demonstrate the point — the Supreme Court has been reluctant to find an 
operative conflict absent intergovernmental conflict. The decisions also 
provide insight into the Supreme Court’s understanding of intergovern-
mental dialogue. In short, it appears to mean, simply, agreement. Little 
emphasis is placed on how agreement is reached; what matters most, it 
seems, is the mere fact of agreement. Finally, these decisions highlight an 
interesting role for judicial review: court challenges now seem to serve 
as an opportunity for intergovernmental dialogue about jurisdiction. 
IV. FUTURE DIRECTIONS?: POST-CANADIAN WESTERN BANK 
The theory of judicial review described in Canadian Western Bank 
continues to animate the Supreme Court’s subsequent division of powers 
decisions.215 However, in these decisions the Supreme Court is increas-
ingly being forced to grapple with difficult questions flowing from its 
embrace of this theory of judicial review. In this section, I outline three 
such questions. I then anticipate an argument that would, if convincing, 
answer, or in the least change the nature of the debate about, these ques-
tions. I do not consider the strengths or weaknesses of this argument 
here; that is left to a future paper. 
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1. The Role of Intergovernmental Dialogue 
One important question that the Supreme Court has failed to address 
in an authoritative manner is the role that intergovernmental dialogue 
will (and should) actually play in division of powers cases. A court asked 
to consider the constitutionality of a legislative measure reflecting some 
element of intergovernmental dialogue could adopt one of four different 
approaches. First, it could hold that the division of powers forbids all 
legislative measures resulting from intergovernmental dialogue. On this 
view, intergovernmental dialogue is a negative factor in assessing consti-
tutionality. Second, it could hold that the division of powers does not 
forbid legislative measures resulting from intergovernmental dialogue, 
but insist that all such legislative measures must respect the division of 
powers as it stands. On this view, intergovernmental dialogue is at best a 
neutral factor in assessing constitutionality. Third, it could hold, not only 
that the division of powers does not forbid legislative measures resulting 
from intergovernmental dialogue, but that the division of powers should 
actually be altered, in some cases, at least, to accommodate intergovern-
mental dialogue. On this view, intergovernmental dialogue is a positive 
factor in assessing constitutionality. Or fourth, it could hold that inter-
governmental dialogue should be decisive in all cases. The Supreme 
Court has sent mixed signals as to which approach it supports. There is 
language in Supreme Court decisions supporting the second approach; 
this is reflected in its claim that intergovernmental agreement is not de-
terminative of constitutionality.216 However, there is strong evidence that 
the Supreme Court is actually inclined to the third approach: intergov-
ernmental dialogue is not necessarily decisive, but it is a positive factor 
to take into account in determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction is 
constitutional.217  
This question is raised squarely in Canada (Attorney General) v. 
Quebec (Attorney General). At issue in that case is the constitutionality 
of various provisions in the federal Assisted Human Reproduction Act.218 
That legislation establishes a detailed federal framework for the regula-
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tion of assisted human reproduction. In 2007, Quebec tabled its own leg-
islation, and then referred various provisions in the federal legislation to 
the Quebec Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal agreed with the prov-
ince that the provisions in question were unconstitutional.219 The federal 
government appealed. The Supreme Court heard argument in the case in 
April of last year and reserved judgment.220  
The case raises the question of intergovernmental dialogue, because 
the federal legislation includes a provision (section 68) that allows cer-
tain provisions in it to be suspended in a province by agreement, 
provided that province has enacted “equivalent”, but not necessarily 
identical, regulatory standards. In prior cases, the Supreme Court seemed 
to take comfort in provisions of this sort in finding federal legislation to 
be constitutional.221 However, the Quebec Court of Appeal adopted quite 
a different approach. It suggested, in essence, that section 68 actually 
counted against, not in favour of, the provisions. Its reasoning is difficult 
to follow, but the general thrust seems to be that, by contemplating the 
possibility of “equivalent” standards, Parliament effectively conceded 
that its purpose was the regulation of health, an area falling within pro-
vincial jurisdiction.222  
The Government of Quebec did not pursue this particular argument 
before the Supreme Court.223 Rather, it argued that provisions of this sort 
can have no bearing on constitutionality, by rendering constitutional an 
otherwise unconstitutional exercise of legislative power. In support, it 
pointed to section 94 of the Constitution Act, 1867, a little-known and 
rarely discussed constitutional provision that allows the federal Parlia-
ment to legislate, with provincial consent, “for the Uniformity of all or 
any of the Laws relative to Property and Civil Rights in Ontario, Nova 
Scotia, and New Brunswick”.224 This argument goes directly to the ques-
tion of the effect of intergovernmental dialogue on constitutionality. The 
argument is, in essence, that it is inappropriate for the Supreme Court to 
take intergovernmental dialogue into account in a division of powers 
case, because the text of the Constitution itself imposes certain proce-
dural and substantive limits on the ability of Parliament to legislate 
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outside its jurisdiction. Intergovernmental dialogue, on this argument, is 
at best a neutral factor in considering constitutionality. 
Before the Supreme Court, the federal government limited itself to 
confronting the Quebec Court of Appeal’s argument that section 68 actu-
ally counted against the impugned provisions.225 It argued that the 
federal Parliament actually had the jurisdiction to enact the provisions 
under its criminal law power, and pointed to previous cases in which the 
Supreme Court seemed to suggest that section 68-type provisions were a 
valid response to the need for a certain degree of cooperation and coordi-
nation between federal and provincial authorities in fields where, as here, 
both orders of government have jurisdiction. 
Quebec raises an interesting point. What is the importance of section 
94 in considering the effect of intergovernmental dialogue on constitu-
tionality? Does it count against the argument that it is appropriate for the 
Supreme Court to bend the division of powers to facilitate intergovern-
mental dialogue, on the basis that it sets particular textual limits on the 
ability of governments to agree to otherwise unconstitutional exercises of 
legislative power by the other order of government? Or does it actually 
count in favour of the argument that it is appropriate for the Supreme 
Court to do so, on the basis that it shows that intergovernmental dialogue 
was actually a positive objective of the drafters? 
This feeds into even broader questions about the effect of intergov-
ernmental dialogue on constitutionality. Is intergovernmental dialogue a 
positive or neutral factor in determining constitutionality? In answering 
this question, does it matter that the federal legislation purports to apply 
in a province until that province decides to legislate in respect of assisted 
human reproduction? Does it matter that a province may not opt out of 
the federal legislation until it has in force “equivalent” regulations, which 
coerces the provinces into accepting, roughly, the minimum federal stan-
dards?226 Does it matter that legislation is structured to accommodate 
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interlocking provincial legislation, if a province(s) objects to the exercise 
of federal jurisdiction on the whole? 
The case highlights these important questions about the role that inter-
governmental dialogue will and ought to play in determining the 
constitutionality of an exercise of legislative power. It would not be espe-
cially surprising to see the Supreme Court avoid providing a definitive 
answer (or at all). However, if it does decide to speak to these questions, in 
whole or in part, it would not be particularly surprising to see it claim fi-
delity to the view, expressed in previous decisions, that intergovernmental 
dialogue is not determinative of constitutionality, while continuing to let 
the idea play a role, quietly, in its decision-making. The reason is this: the 
idea that the political branches have a role to play in actually defining the 
balance of power, rather than working within the boundaries set by the 
courts, sits uncomfortably with the traditional view that it is “emphatically 
the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the law is”.227 It would 
be surprising to see the Supreme Court openly acknowledge that the politi-
cal branches have a role to play in the setting of constitutional meaning 
itself.228  
2. Boundaries on Legislative Power  
The Supreme Court has recently acted with restraint in division of 
powers cases, but it refused to abandon entirely its role in policing the 
boundaries of federal and provincial legislative power. This leaves two 
questions: (1) what role, if any, does the Supreme Court intend to play in 
setting absolute limits on legislative power? and (2) where the Supreme 
Court is faced with a stark choice between competing federal and pro-
vincial legislation, what considerations will it take into account in 
making its choice? In other words, what role does the Supreme Court 
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intend to play in a system where “the task of maintaining the balance of 
powers in practice falls primarily to governments”?229 These questions 
may force the Supreme Court to confront even more difficult questions 
about how different tasks should be allocated “within one and the same 
policy field”.230 
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Consolidated Fastfrate is 
interesting in this regard. In that case, both a federally regulated and a 
provincially regulated union attempted to be certified as the bargaining 
unit for the employees of a freight forwarding company. The issue was not 
the constitutionality of the underlying legislation; the issue, rather, was 
which legislative scheme, federal or provincial, applied to the company’s 
employees. The Supreme Court was faced with a choice between federal 
and provincial jurisdiction. If the federal legislation applied, the federally 
regulated union was properly certifiable as the bargaining unit of the com-
pany’s employees; if, however, the provincial legislation applied, it was the 
provincially regulated union that was properly certifiable.  
The result was a 6-3 split decision. Justice Rothstein, writing for the 
majority, said that the freight forwarding company fell within provincial 
jurisdiction. In reaching this conclusion, he emphasized the manner in 
which the freight forwarding service was provided. The company fell 
within provincial jurisdiction, because it merely consolidated and de-
consolidated freight, and did not actually physically transport the freight 
across provincial borders. In contrast, Binnie J., writing for the dissent, 
said that the freight forwarding company fell within federal jurisdiction. 
Unlike the majority, he emphasized, citing a previous decision of the Su-
preme Court,231 the nature of the service provided by the freight 
forwarding company. The company fell within federal jurisdiction, be-
cause it facilitated the shipment of goods across provincial borders. 
The majority and minority adopted different interpretative ap-
proaches. Departing from recent precedent, Rothstein J. emphasized 
“historical context”. He said, citing Confederation-era documents, that 
“the preference for diversity of regulatory authority over works and un-
dertakings should be respected, absent a justifiable reason that 
exceptional federal jurisdiction should apply”.232 Justice Binnie, in con-
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trast, emphasized economic efficiency. He said, citing Canadian Western 
Bank, that  
Canadian courts have never accepted the sort of “originalism” implicit 
in my colleague’s historical description of the thinking in 1867. … This 
is not to say that the passage of time alters the division of powers. It is 
to say that the arrangement of legislative and executive powers 
entrenched in the Constitution Act, 1867 must now be applied in light 
of the business realities of 2009 and not frozen in 1867.233  
On these facts, federal jurisdiction was to be preferred, because 
checkerboard provincial regulation was antithetical to the coherent and 
efficient operation of an integrated national transportation service. 
The decision in Consolidated Fastfrate may hint at interesting things 
to come. The Supreme Court was faced with a choice between federal 
and provincial legislation. Faced with that choice, the Supreme Court 
seemed unable to agree, not only about the result, but also about the in-
terpretative methodology to apply in reaching that result. (And 
interestingly, Binnie and LeBel JJ., who co-authored the decision in Ca-
nadian Western Bank, appear to have parted company.) This suggests 
that, although there is a measure of agreement on the Supreme Court that 
caution should be exercised before imposing absolute limits on jurisdic-
tion, the justices may have difficulty agreeing about what order of 
government to favour in those cases where they are faced with a choice 
between an exercise of federal and provincial legislative power. If this is 
true, it would not be particularly surprising to see disagreements also 
arise about whether in fact there are still absolute limits on jurisdiction, 
and (more likely) where those limits lie.  
3. Federal Leadership or Equal Partners? 
Recall the earlier distinction drawn in the academic literature be-
tween the narrow sense of cooperative federalism (which envisages a 
hierarchical relationship between the federal government and the provin-
cial governments) and collaborative federalism (which envisages a non-
hierarchical relationship between the federal government and the provin-
cial governments). Which, if either, does the Supreme Court intend to 
facilitate? 
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The answer is that it is difficult to tell. The Supreme Court speaks 
merely of cooperative federalism, without indicating whether it has in 
mind a certain amount of federal-provincial hierarchy. The paramountcy 
decisions provide the most insight into the Supreme Court’s thinking, but 
these decisions send mixed messages.  
Two aspects of these decisions seem to reflect a desire to facilitate a 
hierarchical model of cooperative federalism. Consider the definition of 
conflict. As noted, the Supreme Court broadened the definition of con-
flict in two ways: the impossibility of dual compliance test now includes 
governmental decision-makers, not just citizens; and there will be a con-
flict both where there is an impossibility of dual compliance or a 
frustration of federal purpose. This broader definition of conflict affords 
the federal government a powerful bargaining chip in intergovernmental 
negotiations about jurisdiction. As Katherine Swinton notes, “[t]he [Su-
preme] Court’s attitudes towards … the definition of conflict … affect 
both the agenda and the tenor of intergovernmental relations.”234 Con-
sider also the new focus of a paramountcy analysis. By embracing the 
frustration of federal purpose test, the agenda of the federal government, 
not just citizen compliance, is now central to any paramountcy analy-
sis.235 This seems to indicate that the Supreme Court is particularly 
concerned to facilitate the achievement of federal goals. It is unclear 
whether the Supreme Court has these two considerations in mind. How-
ever, if it does, this would seem to indicate, at best, that the Supreme 
Court is content to facilitate a hierarchical, federally dominant form of 
intergovernmental dialogue about particular exercises of jurisdiction, and 
at worst, that “cooperative federalism” is merely an ex post facto ration-
alization for an approach that seeks to privilege federal legislative power. 
Two other aspects of these decisions, however, may reflect a desire 
to facilitate a non-hierarchical, collaborative model of cooperative feder-
alism. First, the Supreme Court indicated clearly in Rothmans that it will 
be reluctant to “impute to Parliament … an intention to ‘occup[y] the 
field’ in the absence of very clear statutory language to that effect”.236 
Second, in Canadian Western Bank, the Supreme Court reiterated (and 
then applied) the  
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fundamental rule of constitutional interpretation that, “[w]hen a federal 
statute can be properly interpreted so as not to interfere with a 
provincial statute, such an interpretation is to be applied in preference 
to another applicable construction which would bring about a conflict 
between the two statutes”.237  
In effect, both of these “rules” require Parliament to speak clearly if 
it intends to pre-empt provincial legislation. This may serve a delibera-
tive function, ensuring that Parliament proceeds cautiously and 
deliberatively, by at least turning its mind to provincial regulatory inter-
ests in a given field of jurisdiction. But it also may serve a dialogue-
stimulating function. In considering provincial interests, Parliament may 
be encouraged to consult with the provinces, in order to work out a solu-
tion that is acceptable to both orders of government. Failing that, the 
provinces may be put on notice, giving them the opportunity to pressure 
the federal government, politically, to negotiate a solution that is accept-
able to both orders of government.238 It is unclear whether the Supreme 
Court has these considerations in mind in articulating these “rules”, but if 
it does, this would seem to speak to a court that is anxious, where possi-
ble, to facilitate a non-hierarchical, collaborative intergovernmental 
dialogue about particular exercises of jurisdiction. 
4. The Political Safeguards of Canadian Federalism? 
Notice a fundamental difference in the ideas expressed in the previ-
ous two paragraphs. In one paragraph, the focus is the definition of 
conflict; this reflects an underlying assumption that judicially defined 
and enforceable limits on federal power are critically important in a fed-
eral system. On this view, a court that adopts a broad definition of 
conflict is placing the provinces at the mercy of a federal government 
that can displace provincial regulation at its whim. In the other para-
graph, little emphasis is placed on judicially defined and enforced limits 
on federal power; the limits on federal power are assumed to lie in the 
political process. This touches upon a fundamental assumption that 
seems to underlie the theory of judicial review described in this paper: 
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this is the idea that the political branches are up to the task of setting the 
balance of power, and capable of protecting their own interests in doing 
so. 
Is this view defensible? The idea of the political safeguards of feder-
alism has figured prominently in American academic and judicial 
writing.239 However, the idea has received little sustained attention in 
Canada.240 The assumption seems to be that the idea has little purchase in 
Canada, because there are no (or insufficient) political safeguards in the 
Canadian federal system.241 It is beyond the scope of this paper to con-
sider the accuracy of this view here; I leave that for future work. But if it 
is true that there are political safeguards operating in the Canadian fed-
eral system, this would seem to have important implications for each of 
the three questions raised above. If there are political safeguards at work, 
there is a strong argument that intergovernmental dialogue ought to play 
an important (perhaps even decisive) role in constitutional adjudication. 
Moreover, the need for the courts to intervene is significantly reduced, 
and the whole question of what limits the Supreme Court will and ought 
to place on federal and/or provincial legislative power becomes much 
less of a concern. Finally, the idea would shed a whole new light on the 
Supreme Court’s current approach to the paramountcy doctrine. The Su-
preme Court may not be abandoning the provinces to the whim of the 
federal government, as it might seem, but may indeed be working from 
the assumption that the provinces have the tools at their disposal to pro-
tect their own interests.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
In Canadian Western Bank, the Supreme Court provided rare and 
rich insight into its theory of judicial review in division of powers cases. 
Under this theory, the Supreme Court encourages the political branches 
to take the lead in defining the federal-provincial division of powers, by 
working out mutually agreeable allocations of jurisdiction in each area of 
regulatory concern. The Supreme Court primarily limits itself to facilitat-
ing intergovernmental dialogue about the division of powers and to 
resolving the intergovernmental conflicts that result where the political 
branches fail to agree. 
This theory of judicial review is reflected in the McLachlin Court’s 
division of powers decisions. It is reflected overtly in those situations 
where the Supreme Court is asked to consider the constitutionality of a 
legislative measure evidencing some measure of intergovernmental 
agreement about jurisdiction. But it is also reflected, albeit less overtly, 
in the overall approach to the division of powers. Under this approach, 
the Supreme Court acts with considerable restraint in imposing absolute 
limits on federal and provincial jurisdiction, by accommodating substan-
tial overlap in jurisdiction, and primarily limits itself to managing 
overlapping legislation to avoid conflicts in operation. 
This theory of judicial review raises a number of interesting ques-
tions, some of which I outlined in the final section of this paper. The 
Supreme Court has indeed given constitutional law scholars good reason 
to care again about the division of powers.242 
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